Posts Tagged ‘India’
April 20, 2012
The Economist has a new story today called China’s Achilles Heel, focusing on their declining birth rate and rapidly aging population. If current rates hold, then by 2050 China is expected to have over 350 million citizens over the age of 65 – about 1/4 of their projected population – and at least 30% of that number is expected to be 80 or over. This will put an increasing burden on Chinese social services and health care systems. This is part of what I have taken to calling “Peak China.” China is probably at or near the peak of its economic power right now, and its wave will crest before it passes the United States.
It is the other rising Asian giant that is destined to surpass the United States and become the next leading world power. India has nearly as large a population as does China, and its fertility rate is much higher. This means that, not only will it continue to grow, it will not age as rapidly and the economy will have sufficient numbers of young, productive workers to support a modern state. Additionally, India currently has an adult literacy rate of only 63%, vs. China’s 94%. This means that India has much more intellectual capacity to mine and develop for the knowledge economies of the 21st century, while China has nearly maximized its own potential.
Posted in China, India, Peak China | Tagged demography, India, Peak China | Leave a Comment »
April 19, 2012
Namrata Goswami, writing for India’s Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, details the history of the Chinese claims of sovereignty of the peripheral Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. China’s claims are grounded in the historical ties of Arunachal Pradesh to Tibet, which China claims to be, not an independent sovereign state, but rather a historic and integral part of greater China which was rightfully reunified with the core in 1949. India followed this action by annexing Arunachal Pradesh in 1951, and there have been border skirmishes and boundary disputes between the two powers ever since. Goswami covers this history in her report.
Goswami then details the very large Chinese military buildup in and around Tibet, and outlines the danger that this presents to India. In addition to the overt military buildup, China’s aggressive infrastructure development in this remote region will give that nation the ability to rapidly mobilize troops to the border in the event of a future conflict, a definite advantage over India, which side of the border does not have a modern transportation system developed.
Goswami concludes with a list of policy options for the Indian government to take in order to prevent and/or prepare for any conflict with China over the region. India’s defense and infrastructure needs here presents an opportunity for the US to further deepen our developing ties with India. Goswami’s policy recommendations include infrastructure projects (especially roads and other transportation efforts) and the development of a military special forces contingent that can rapidly deploy to the region. After our experience in Afghanistan, the US military has more experience with fighting in high altitude regions than any high tech military in the world. A training program to share that experience with and to transfer relevant technologies to Indian forces would be an excellent way for the US to maintain its influence in South Asia even after the eventual withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Posted in China, geopolitics, India | Tagged China, geostrategy, India | Leave a Comment »
January 24, 2012
Geopolitically, Pakistan is hemmed in between Iran to its west and India to its east. In India, it has what it believes to be a mortal enemy with which it has been at various levels of war since independence; in Iran, it has a rival for leadership in the Islamic world. Pakistani leaders would like their nation to be the center of a pan-Islamic quasi-Caliphate to balance the growing power of India. To that end, it’s Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence has built what some call “an empire of terror” throughout the nations of Central Asia. ISI has a in every pie, with the dual goals of thwarting other Islamic nations for leadership (Iran and, increasingly, Turkey) plus building a deterrent for India. Window on the Heartland has recently posted an overview of Pakistan’s use of terror as a geostrategic lever:
Pakistan has always desired to expand its influence in Afghanistan and beyond. Central Asia is seen as an area of natural expansion for the country. Islamabad’s objectives in the region are determined by its geopolitical imperative: to turn itself into the leader of an Islamic bloc stretching from the Black Sea to China able to counter India’s influence and become an autonomous actor on the international scene. In this context, the destabilizing efforts carried out by the ISI through support to terrorist groups in Central Asia since the early 90s have been aimed at creating the right conditions so that the Pakistani leadership could gradually take over from of other major powers such as Russia, China and the United States.
Read the whole thing.
The ISI has built what is in essence a model for a low-tech, asymmetric analog to the integrated defense network centered on complex weapons systems that the US is building.
Posted in Central Asia, geopolitics, Grand Strategy, Pakistan | Tagged geopolitics, geostrategy, India, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey | Leave a Comment »
December 7, 2011
Although Pakistan has long believed that Afghanistan was in their sphere of influence, their arch-rival India is preparing to step into the breach when US forces leave:
plans are already in the final stages of receiving Indian government clearance for an extensive training schedule for the fledgling Afghan National Army (ANA) at training institutions across the country.
The program is the first concrete follow-up on military-to-military cooperation under the umbrella of the Strategic Partnership Agreement that was signed between Kabul and New Delhi in October, when Afghan President Hamid Karzai was given a grand reception in India.
Under the agreement, India, which has the world’s third-largest army, agreed to train, equip and build the capacity of the Afghan forces.
Sources in the Indian security establishment familiar with the contours of the detailed schedule say Kabul and New Delhi have identified three areas to focus on, namely increasing the intake of officers in India’s premier training institutes; providing specialized training to middle and higher level officers already operating in the Afghan National Army (ANA); and training soldiers in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations by seconding them to various regimental centers across India.
Posted in Afghanistan, Coalitioning, India, Pakistan | Tagged Afghanistan, coalitioning, India, Pakistan | Leave a Comment »
November 23, 2011
Diplomats will try to avoid the word containment, but the US has certainly begun to close a loop around maritime China (they still have potential outlets through the Eurasian Heartland): Expanded US naval presence in Australia and Singapore, F-16s to Indonesia, diplomatic openings with Vietnam and the Philippines, possible inclusion of India in the F-35 program. India’s Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis continues the list:
That Chinese diplomacy has played right into hands of the US is increasingly being recognized. Chinese threats and bluster have antagonized almost all the nations of East and South East Asia. Alarm bells have been ringing in their respective capitals as to what the Chinese intentions are. Not willing to take any chances on Chinese belligerence, almost all have begun to strengthen their defence networks. Vietnam has increased its defence budget by 70 per cent this year and Indonesia announced a 35 per cent increase in its defence outlay for this year. The Republic of Korea [ROK] is building a large naval base on Jeju Island whose location indicates that it will cater for security in the East China Sea rather than against North Korea. The US has agreed to retrofit 145 Taiwanese F-16 fighters. Similarly, Malaysia and Singapore have increased their defence purchases by a whopping 700 per cent and 140 per cent respectively. There is no doubt that the US-Australia decision to enhance their security profile by stationing 2500 Marines at Darwin is due to the same fears. The Australian decision to sell uranium to India can also be seen in the same light.
Even in the case of India, Chinese ham-handedness and belligerence have led to the addition of two new divisions for the Indian army to be deployed along the Sino-Indian border region. The US, Japan and India are to have a trilateral security dialogue by the end of this year followed by joint Indo-Japan naval exercises in 2012.
The only point I would make is that this will end up being a containment dominated by a quadrilateral power set, not trilateral – add Australia to the mix and the trio of Japan, India and Australia form the points of a geographic triangle of containment, with the US acting as an offshore balancer and working to bring the smaller nations of maritime South and East Asia into the effort.
This effort was obvious even to me, as an amateur observer, but kudos nonetheless to the State Department for setting it in motion to such effect thus far.
Posted in China, Coalitioning | Tagged China, coalitioning, F35, Geopolitcs of Weapons Systems, India | Leave a Comment »
November 17, 2011
It is my belief that, while it continues to be a major economic force and will challenge US supremacy in the coming decades, China’s long term potential is at or near its peak. Like a supertanker that takes a long time to turn, this peak may not be evident for awhile, and policy makers will continue to make moves as if China is still, inevitably, rising. Still, the signs that China has peaked are around. Yesterday, there was a report that a major Chinese economist had made a secret speech claiming that many of China’s financial numbers are fabricated and that, in fact, the nation is close to bankruptcy. Today, it is Amitai Etzioni at National Interest, with an essay on the Overblown Fears About China’s Rise.
Of course, this does not mean that China is suddenly rendered impotent. Indeed, as they recognize their peak, they may become more dangerous, knowing that their moment is slipping away. For that reason, the US will still attend to its coalitioning moves, strengthening ties with allies surrounding China. Earlier this week, we noted the moves to share the advanced F-35 aircraft withIndia and Japan. Yesterday, it was announced that the US would establish a naval presence in Northern Australia. These moves are not just aimed at China, but also at the various nations of the Southern Asian periphery that have concerns about China. A US presence in the region serves to bring many of them into our orbit, as analysts in India have already noted:
The US move to create a naval base in northern Australia close to the South China Sea can actually mean more dollars in the Indian kitty, and put more strategic and business opportunities in New Delhi’s way, sources said. The first piece of evidence has come by way of Australia’s decision to sell uranium to India.
The US move will provide a sense of protection to East Asian countries including Japan, who have serious conflicts with China but buy vast amounts of Chinese goods. The new found protection will encourage East Asia to reduce its dependence on China for goods and enhance economic ties with India, sources said.
“Japan, Vietnam and Indonesia will feel more secure. India and Indonesia can get together to control the Malacca Straits, which is the route though which 90% of Chinese goods to East Asia passes,” Subramanian Swamy, Janata Party president and a widely regarded China expert, told TNN.
I have not agreed with everything they have done (especially the failure to maximize the strategic domestic energy resources), but this is a very strong move by the Obama Administration.
Posted in Coalitioning, geopolitics, Grand Strategy, Peak China | Tagged Australia, China, F35, geopolitics, India, Peak China | Leave a Comment »
November 15, 2011
India is preparing a major new purchase of fighter aircraft, and has spent years evaluating six major contenders. Recently, the field was narrowed to two – the French Rafaele and the Eurofighter Typhoon. In the original competition, the US fielded two different competitors – the F-16 and the F-18 (the other early contenders were Saab’s Gripen and Russia’s Mig-29). However, the US is apparently not entirely out of the competition just yet. The US is trying to interest India in the new F-35, our second most advanced fighter. The F-35 was not under initial consideration because it’s cost puts it outside the parameters of India’s initial goal, and also it was not thought that it would be available in the time frame that India prefers. However, the US may be willing to subsidize the price and to sweeten the deal by developing and building some of the components in joint ventures with Indian contractors.
The F-35 would certainly be the most capable of all the contenders, and might be uniquely configured for India’s needs because of its short and vertical take off capabilities (although the S-VTOL versions will not be available for several more years).
As The Diplomat points out, this is more than a simple aircraft supply bid. India will be a key player in the geopolitics of the 21st century, and the US is keen to foster a deep military relationship there. To contain any threat of an aggressive China, the US needs to organize the nations of the Asian periphery, of which India is key. For that reason, the F-35 is also being offered to Japan. India and Japan would join longtime US allies Australia, has been a participant in the program from the beginning, and Singapore, which has been participating since 2003.
Posted in Coalitioning, geopolitics, India | Tagged coalitioning, F35, Geopolitics of Weapons Systems, India | 1 Comment »
November 4, 2011
Himachal Pradesh is a far northern Indian state, nestled high in the Himalayan mountains and sharing a border with Chinese occupied Tibet. The governor of Himachal Pradesh is concerned about Chinese militarization of its far west regions. China and India have already fought one war (the 1962 Sino-Indian War) and several skirmishes over their ill defined borders in the Himalayan region, and as China continues to militarize the high altitude regions, Chief Minister Prem Kumar Dhumal fears a replay of the unpreparedness that led to defeat in the 1962 war:
Speaking at the National Development Council (NDC) meeting here, Dhumal said “India faces a major military threat from neighboring China and the Indian Army should be made fully capable of fighting in the tough terrain hilly regions. And with this objective a separate army regiment drawn from youths of hilly areas should be set up in the army so as its soldiers are well conversant with tough geography and topography of the region and are also prepared mentally and physically to encounter the enemy in this region”, Dhumal said. He requested the central government to make suitable provision for setting up the Himlayan Regiment in the 12th Plan.
US forces, with a decade of experience of high altitude combat, would be uniquely qualified to aid Indian in the training of the Himalayan Regiment. This would be an excellent opportunity for the US to deepen and strengthen our relationship with India
Posted in China, Grand Strategy, India | Tagged China, grand strategy, India | Leave a Comment »
November 2, 2011
The Indian Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis has an interesting lecture scheduled for this Friday (Nov. 4 2011) titled Psychological Science, Strategy, and China’s Periphery. The description of the lecture states:
Advances in psychological science over the last 50 years have led to its increased and productive applications in the broad area of behavior modification in many fields including education, medicine, financial services, communication and media. Yet, curiously, its role in strategy and international relations appears to have been limited. This paper looks at how application of the scientific method in general and psychological science in particular could illuminate some current problems in these areas. Some issues concerning China’s border regions are used as examples to develop new perspectives and create hypotheses for further investigation.
The topic sounds fascinating and as I will not be able to attend, I look forward to obtaining a copy of the paper. The lecturer, Ravi Bhoothalingam, wrote a paper earlier this year titled Unraveling the Mind of China (link to a pdf of that paper) that I also found quite interesting. In that earlier paper, Bhoothalingam uses a psycholinguistic model to examine the distinct ways of thinking for the emerging Asian rivals of China and India. The argument is that the Chinese character driven language and the Indian alphabet driven language each create different mental capacities:
In India, our experience of diversity in daily life, whether of caste, creed, language or custom, has generated a flair for flexibility and cultural adaptation that is widely recognized, not least in the adaptability of Indians in new environments. The Indian mind also seems capable of operating at several levels, simultaneously holding views that may be directly in opposition. I am reminded of my experience as a child, going for an‘idli’ breakfast at the house of astronomer and physicist Dr. K.S. Krishnan, F.R.S. After his ‘puja’, he meticulously rendered astrological advice to his family early every morning, but come 8 o’clock, was dressed in his suit and ready to leave for his office at the National Physical Laboratory, where he replied to letters from Einstein and Eddington. Indians take this kind of rare ‘two-brain’ ability for granted. The Chinese are constantly amazed at our fluency with languages and grasp of other cultures, our ability to deliver results amidst apparent chaos, and our flexibility in coping with issues both mundane and serious.
The character-pattern that underlies the way in which Chinese thought is formulated in turn makes certain modes of thinking more prevalent. One is inductive logic, which results as the Chinese mind systematically explores its universe, starting with what is known and near, and moving outward in an empirical manner, colourfully expressed in the proverb “crossing the river by feeling the stones”. But by virtue of the power of the pattern formation process, sincepatterns can be inverted, reflected, etc, there is also the prevalence of a type of non-linear and paradoxical thinking at which the right brain is adept. Thus, intuitive inversions and paradoxical solutions (like the ‘one country, two systems’ formula for the Hong Kong issue) are also possible. Patterns make it possible for seemingly opposing ideas to be also complementary (the yin-yang diagram). Finally, from a strategic viewpoint, placing issues as part of a long-term and broader vision or grand pattern allows temporary turbulences and short-term anomalies to be handled in the right perspective, without these irritants having the ability to hijack the grand strategy. The converse of this process is that there is also likely to be rigidity in the patterns once formed, leading to inflexible and insensitive responses when situations change.
The distinctive modes of thinking in the two countries also give a clue to their failures. India has had problems in establishing both the structure and pattern of governance across large swathes of its national territory. In China’s case, structural rigidity in its governance procedures has caused the emotional alienation of its outlying provinces. India has not generated mass mobilization of opinion in favour of rapid progress in health, education and infrastructure. In China, over-enthusiastic or coercive bureaucratic mass mobilization has resulted in much injury and injustice to its people.
While some might conclude that such vastly different ways of apprehending the world might lead to natural rivalries and frequent misunderstandings between the two nations (as has often been the case), Bhoothalingam makes the case that these differences create not mutually exclusive, but rather mutually supporting competencies that hold the promise of forming strong synergies in multiple areas, and that the future of the China/India relationship might be one of cooperation rather than of competition.
Again, very interesting, I suggest you read the whole thing (and look out for the full paper/presentation from Friday’s lecture).
Posted in China, India | Tagged China, India, psycholinguistics | Leave a Comment »
October 19, 2011
Last month, the Global Times – an official organ of the Chinese Communist Party – published on the same day two opposing opinion pieces on the South China Sea. Each was written pseudonymously (a common practice for that paper); the first was a belligerent take that warned Vietnam and the Philippines about possible severe military action that China was willing to take; the other was a more conciliatory take offering the possibility of collaboration. Seemingly, a classic good cop/bad cop issue. Or maybe not.
Today, R. S. Kahla writing for India’s Institute for Defense Studies & Analysis, dissects the two pieces. Kahla does not see this as a good cop/bad cop scenario. Rather, he sees it as indicative of a split within the Chinese leadership over the best direction to take toward SCS issues. He concludes:
The dilemma for the Chinese leadership . . . remains acute. Any further bluster or threats will only further solidify the anti-Chinese stance that seems to be developing in Southeast Asia, backed from the outside by the US and Japan. The issuing of threats would leave them with few friends in Asia, with the notable exception of North Korea and Pakistan. On the other hand, vacillation or adoption of a softer approach might result in Chinese claims going up in smoke as Southeast Asian countries, with the active support of the US and Japan, seek to carve out their respective claims or come to an understanding amongst themselves without caring for the Chinese claims. A dreadful thought for an aspiring super power!
Read the whole thing. I would also point out that the US and Japan are not the only outside powers seeking to backstop the small ASEAN nations. India, as evidenced by the IDSA’s own interest in the issue, is also playing a significant role in this game.
*update* Walter Russell Mead today also has a post on this general topic. Mead is optimistic that the continued economic development of the region, plus India and Japan, diminishes the threat of conflict and makes the creation of a stable East Asian order more likely. Possibly. On the other hand, the presence of such a wide variety of often competing and overlapping interests might also make a serious conflict more, rather than less, likely.
Posted in China, East Asia, India, Japan, South China Sea | Tagged China, East Asia, India, Japan, South China Sea | Leave a Comment »
September 29, 2011
India’s state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Company (ONGC) announced yesterday that it has signed a deal with Vietnam to develop off shore sites in the South China Sea. The announcement was met with an immediate response from the Chinese Foreign Ministry:
As for oil and gas exploration activities, our consistent position is that we are opposed to any country engaged in oil and gas exploration and development activities in waters under China’s jurisdiction. We hope foreign countries do not get involved in the South China Sea dispute.
China makes vast claims to sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, based on what they term as “ancient” rights. As the map below demonstrates, the Chinese claims overlap those of every other nation bordering the oil-rich sea (Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia). Vietnam makes the next largest claim in the region, claiming an area extending out 200 miles from their coastline based on the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Seas.
This is not the first run-in between China and India over the South China Sea – last summer, a Chinese naval vessel confronted an Indian navy ship in Vietnamese waters, and just two weeks ago, China issued a formal warning to all nations that it considered the SCS its “indisputable” property. China also had brief naval run-ins with both Vietnam and Philippines this summer.
China also sees an American hand behind India’s push into the SCS. “As a South Asian country, India actively takes part in East Asian issues through the support of the US, which has been advocating for Asian countries to counter China. The US takes every opportunity to counter China, and its joint military maneuvers with Japan and other regional countries have been more frequent in recent years,” Chinese think-tanker Wu Xinbo told the Global Times.
Personally, I don’t believe the US is “pushing” India at all. India’s natural growth and needs – and wariness of China – provide all the necessary impetus. Although, as I have written before, the United States should seek to encourage and foster India’s growth as a world power, as we have much in common as the world’s two largest democracies and as flowers from the same tree of British liberal tradition. While it is in no one’s interest to see a war break out in the vital sea lanes of the SCS, and the US should thus seek to soothe both sides rather than inflame them, it is certainly in the long term interest of the US to ally with a growing Indian maritime presence.
Posted in China, geopolitics, Grand Strategy, India, oil, South China Sea | Tagged China, geopolitics, India, naval power, oil, South China Sea | Leave a Comment »
September 27, 2011
Rajeev Srinivasan presents in this article a very harsh and stinging analysis of the US adventure in Afghanistan from an Indian point of view. The author claims that the Pakistani intelligence service, ISI, has mastered “the fine art of running with the hares while hunting with the hounds” and has twisted the US to its own strategic goals (while bamboozling successive US administrations into paying for its own defeat). Srinivasan writes:
In effect, the only ones who have benefited from the collapse of American clout are the Arabs, the Pakistanis and the Chinese. The Arabs, especially the oil-exporting dictatorships (with the sole exception of Libya) have managed to maintain their status quo ante, and they have parlayed the billions from an oil-addicted world into radicalised millions everywhere through insistent propaganda.
The Pakistanis have achieved their coveted ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan which is, in effect, their colony. True, there has been some cost to them in civilian casualties and the Frankenstein monster of internal terrorism, but that is collateral damage the Army is willing to accept in the pursuit of their strategic goals.
The unkindest cut is perhaps that China has won against the Americans. Again. This is the third military conflict where China has had the better of the Americans. In Korea, they fought to a standstill. In Vietnam, a then-Chinese ally defeated the Americans. In Afghanistan, Chinese ally Pakistan is doing this. This must be China’s dream come true: they are beating the Americans militarily and economically.
Srinivasan, again, is writing from the Indian point of view and ponders the question of what India should do going forward. If I might interject my American point of view, I believe that India and the US have deeply shared interests not only in Central, South and Southwest Asia, but globally as well. I believe that India, because of its democratic heritage, relatively open society, and latent power (both hard and soft) is destined to succeed the US as global hegemon, if not at the end of the current cycle, then certainly by the end of this century when the sixth cycle closes. Just as the British handed off hegemony to the US during the last century, the United States should build deep ties with India, begin a strategy of “graceful decline,” and prepare to hand off global leadership to India. The US can play a supporting role to Indian hegemony not unlike the one that Great Britain played for the US. It is the current world system of open markets and democratic nations that best provides security and prosperity, and this is the best means of maintaining that system.
Posted in Afghanistan, geopolitics, Grand Strategy, India, Long Cycle Theory | Tagged Afghanistan, geopolitics, grand strategy, India, Long Cycle Theory | 2 Comments »
September 21, 2011
Two recent reports from the invaluable Bug Pit spotlight India’s slow expansion of relatively soft military presence into the formerly Russian controlled nations of Central Asia.
First, from last month, a story noting that the Indian Defence Ministry would begin building a hospital in Tajikistan for Tajik military officers, while at the same time noting India’s expanding ties with Kyrgyzstan’s military – both a training mission and a high-altitude research facility. Now, a month later, news that India will be taking over a torpedo testing and manufacturing facility, built by the Soviets and only recently abandoned by the Russians.
The rising global powers of Russia, China and India are all scrambling to stake out positions in Central Asia, as are regional powers Turkey and Iran. Meanwhile, the reigning global hegemon – the US – maintains probably the most military power in the region, even with the ongoing draw downs in Iraq and Afghanistan. This region is where the coalitioning phase of the Long Cycle is most evident.
Posted in Central Asia, Coalitioning, India | Tagged Central Asia, coalitioning, India | 1 Comment »
September 8, 2011
Taking the family to LegoLand, so this will be the last post until Monday. Just a bunch of links to important or interesting stories that I did not get to fully cover in this shortened week.
Elizabeth Economy asks “Is it time to harden our Asian alliances?” The answer, of course, is yes.
In other coalitioning news, Defense News reports that India and Mongolia are fostering defense ties, including joint exercises, a development that must concern China.
Oil & Gas warns Canada about the economic dangers of instituting a moratorium on shale gas.
The job creating machines that are oil sands & shales.
Unlike shale plays, where this is a lot of room for smaller operators to act, Arctic exploration will involve primarily large energy companies. Meanwhile, China is seeking a seat at the Arctic decision making table, criticizing the Arctic-bordering nations for moving forward without considering other nations. China will, of course, seek to be a consumer of- and preferably a major investor in – Arctic energy, and are also interested in the opening of vastly shorter trans-Arctic shipping lanes due to the increasing summertime ice melts.
While China seeks to flex its economic muscles, a pair of reports express a little caution about China’s future. Walter Russell Mead reports on problems with China’s growth model, while The Diplomat reminds us that China may not be exceptional and may sooner rather than later experience the S shaped growth curve that has been the norm for great powers.
Posted in Arctic, China, Coalitioning, India, Shale Age | Tagged China, coalitioning, India, Shale Age | Leave a Comment »
August 15, 2011
Marine Insight presents a list of the ten most troublesome piracy zones in the world. There is a lot of double-counting in their list, which basically covers four areas: The Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea, the Arabian Sea including the Gulfs of Aden and Oman and extending into the greater Indian Ocean, and the Gulf of Guinea. To this you can add the legendary Spanish Main, El Caribe, as the 2010 Piracy Incident Map from the IMB Piracy Reporting Center shows, and you can see the real Top 5 Piracy zones.
This graphically illustrates that India is both the nation whose commerce faces the greatest threat from piracy, and also why that nation is most strategically positioned to take the lead in combating the threat. Yet another reason why India’s ongoing naval buildup should continue.
Posted in India, navy | Tagged India, Navy, piracy | 3 Comments »
August 11, 2011
Op Ed from the Asia Times that adds detail from our post yesterday. We focused on the dangers to India’s eastern coast from the ongoing creep of Chinese naval power; Michael Kugelman’s op ed for the Times echoes that point, but expands on the strategic importance of India’s western approaches:
It is energy security, however, that most starkly illuminates the navy’s significance. With indigenous energy supplies unable to satisfy prodigious demand (the country is projected to become the world’s third-largest energy consumer by 2030), India has developed a severe addiction to overseas hydrocarbons. Today, two-thirds of India’s oil consumption originates abroad.
Most of these energy resources, along with the transit routes used to bring them home, are sea-based and situated in volatile regions. From offshore assets in the turbulent Persian Gulf to piracy-riven sea lanes off the coast of Somalia, India faces constant threats of energy supply shocks. Additionally, even as India strengthens its own offshore energy infrastructure (several thousand kilometers of pipeline have been laid to facilitate oil and gas flow from offshore platforms to onshore terminals), they remain vulnerable to attack by militants.
India has a large and impressive navy. The convergence of interests in the Indian Ocean should compel the US to form a more active naval alliance with the world’s largest democracy. India should be a linchpin in an alliance of the other great powers of Mackinder’s Outer Crescent – the US, Great Britain, Japan, Australia and India.
Posted in China, geopolitics, India, navy | Tagged geopolitics, India, Navy, strategy | 1 Comment »
August 10, 2011
The Indian Navy’s Eastern Command has nearly doubled it’s warship total from 30 in 2005 to 50 today. They are additionally planning to build new naval facilities along the east coast, and to re-assign the navy’s lone aircraft carrier to the East once they take receipt of their second carrier, purchased from Russia.
The Indian Navy has traditionally been focused on the Western Command, where their longtime rival Pakistan sits astride the vital sea lanes from the Persian Gulf and Europe. But the increased Chinese presence in South East Asia is forcing both an expansion of Indian naval assets and a fortification of the eastern approaches.
Report from the Calcutta Telegraph
Posted in China, geopolitics, India, navy | Tagged China, geopolitics, India, naval power | 1 Comment »
August 3, 2011
This report from the Wall Street Journal (subscription required) updates the latest in disputes over oil rights in the South China Sea (see recent EGP post on the SCS here).
Meanwhile, the Times of India reports that China is expanding its reach into the Indian Ocean for the first time, seeking to mine the seabed for minerals. India has been nervously watching as China builds its “String of Pearls” from the Arabian to the South China Seas, this is just the latest manifestation of the new Chinese imperialism.
Posted in China, geopolitics, India, oil, South China Sea, strategic geography | Tagged China, geopolitics, India, oil, South China Sea | Leave a Comment »
