Posts Tagged ‘geopolitics’

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China set to grab Canada oilsands if US declines

August 11, 2011

Forbes:

A rancorous debate over TransCanada Corp.’s (T.TRP) proposed Keystone XL Pipeline has given rise to two uncomfortable prospects: If the US$7 billion project is not built, Alberta’s oil sands will become landlocked, at least for a while, and the United States will lose access to one of its few reliable, friendly sources of oil.

Keystone XL is a proposed pipeline that would run from Edmonton—the hub of Canada’s massive oil sands—through Montana, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, to Houston. The line is critical to ensure a continued, smooth ramp-up in oil sands production, because producers need to send the heavy bitumen extracted from the sands to refineries able to handle that kind of crude. Since refineries in the Midwest are reaching their heavy-oil capacity, it needs to go to the Gulf Coast.

. . .

The decision lies with the State Department, because the pipeline crosses international borders. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is expected to announce her decision before the end of the year. The department already issued a preliminary environmental impact assessment, which seems generally supportive of the project. For example, the State Department concluded that if Keystone XL is not built, oil sands production will be diverted to other markets (such as China), and the refineries in Texas will continue to process bitumen apace from offshore platforms. As such, the pipeline would not increase production of greenhouse gases.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) does not agree. In a letter to the State Department this week, the EPA argued that the project poses serious environmental risks and that the State Department’s environmental review process was seriously flawed.

. . .

Environmentalists are openly using the project as a proxy for their general opposition to oil sands development. Since environmentalists have framed the debate in that sense, Clinton’s decision will have ramifications far beyond the pipeline: It will set the tone for the U.S.’s perspective on the oil sands. But even though environmentalists would celebrate a Keystone denial, their method may be moot, because denying TransCanada approval for Keystone XL would only hinder oil sands development for a few years.

The thing is, if there is no Keystone XL, Canada will find other ways to export oil from its vast oil sands. And if the United States doesn’t want the oil, other markets will.

. . . The oil sands hold 171.3 billion barrels of oil in reserve. For context, Saudi Arabia’s reserves stand at 264.2 billion barrels. The enormity of the oil sands resource has raised the stakes for both sides in the pipeline debate and placed undue importance on the outcome.

Read the whole thing.

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China launches 1st Carrier, Taiwan plans to sink it

August 10, 2011

On the day the the People’s Liberation Army Navy officially took to sea with it’s first aircraft carrier, named Varyag, Taiwan introduced the Hsiung Feng 3, their own version of a “carrier killer” anti-ship missile, complete with a mural depicting an attack on the Varyag.

Artist's rendition of Hsiung Feng 3 attacking the PLAN Varyag

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Indian Navy, wary of China, building up it’s Eastern Fleet

August 10, 2011

The Indian Navy’s Eastern Command has nearly doubled it’s warship total from 30 in 2005 to 50 today.  They are additionally planning to build new naval facilities along the east coast, and to re-assign the navy’s lone aircraft carrier to the East once they take receipt of their second carrier, purchased from Russia.

The Indian Navy has traditionally been focused on the Western Command, where their longtime rival Pakistan sits astride the vital sea lanes from the Persian Gulf and Europe.  But the increased Chinese presence in South East Asia is forcing both an expansion of Indian naval assets and a fortification of the eastern approaches.

Report from the Calcutta Telegraph

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First Chinese Aircraft Carrier to set sail today

August 9, 2011

Via Andrew Erickson . . . as Erickson notes, it is not time to worry yet.  The US has a big lead but it is early in the game and China is chipping away.   Pentagon needs to get serious about defense priorities.  Even with looming cuts, there is enough money to secure US interests if they are prioritized.   Maintaining naval supremacy should be at the top of the list.

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Turkey the next bubble?

August 9, 2011

The usually prescient Spengler has been ringing this bell for months.  His latest:

Erdogan’s bubble recalls Argentina in 2000 or Mexico in 1994, where a brief boom financed by short-term foreign capital flows led to currency devaluation and a deep economic slump. In the advent of the June 12 national elections, which returned Erdogan as prime minister, the Turkish government bought votes through cheap credit.

. . . Financing higher consumption with short-term debt helps explain why Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) crushed its secular opposition in the elections. Erdogan campaigned on his success as an economic manager rather than his Islamist ambitions, with good reason, for most Turks cares more about material welfare than the AKP’s religious agenda.

An economic slump would undercut Erdogan’s ability to govern. His confrontation with his country’s military leaders, who last week resigned en masse to protest the persecution of senior officers on fanciful allegations of political crimes, points to the deep fissure in Turkish politics.

. . . Now that the Cairo mob has turned against the “Internet-savvy” protesters on Tahrir Square, Libya and Yemen remain immersed in civil war, and Syria’s Bashar al-Assad regime butchers civilians, there is not a single stable polity in the Arab world outside of Saudi Arabia, whose circumstances are unique. What I called “the Internet bubble in Middle East politics” in a February 16 essay (See here) has popped, to the embarrassment of the Western reporters who drooled over the Internet cafe-flies who prompted Egypt’s popular rebellion.  If it turns out – as I predict – that the “Turkish model” differed little from the old Latin American borrow-and-bully model, we should conclude that no successful political model presently exists in the Muslim world.

Read the whole thing.  The question that follows is:  In which direction does Turkey turn for help?  The West is teetering financially and may not be able to help.  Does a failure of “the Turkish model” push Turkey further into the Russian/Chinese orbit?

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Oil, Minerals drive maritime tensions in South & Southeast Asia

August 3, 2011

This report from the Wall Street Journal (subscription required) updates the latest in disputes over oil rights in the South China Sea (see recent EGP post on the SCS here).

Meanwhile, the Times of India reports that China is expanding its reach into the Indian Ocean for the first time, seeking to mine the seabed for minerals.  India has been nervously watching as China builds its “String of Pearls” from the Arabian to the South China Seas, this is just the latest manifestation of the new Chinese imperialism.

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The Obama Dominoes

August 1, 2011

I wrote over the weekend how the situation in Iraq is suddenly crumbling while the (what should have been) certain victory in Libya is also slipping away.   The Obama Administration is preparing the ground for a withdrawal from Afghanistan.  The Arab Spring has swept away our longtime ally Hosni Mubarak in Egypt.  Turkey is turning its back on secularism, and casting eyes toward our rivals Russia and China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.  With American power and prestige in the region in obvious decline, even the linchpin of American strategy in the region – stalwart ally Saudi Arabia – is seeking an entente with our regional nemesis, Iran.  From Stratfor lst month:  Something extraordinary, albeit not unexpected, is happening in the Persian Gulf region. The United States, lacking a coherent strategy to deal with Iran and too distracted to develop one, is struggling to navigate Iraq’s fractious political landscape in search of a deal that would allow Washington to keep a meaningful military presence in the country beyond the end-of-2011 deadline stipulated by the current Status of Forces Agreement. At the same time, Saudi Arabia, dubious of U.S. capabilities and intentions toward Iran, appears to be inching reluctantly toward an accommodation with its Persian adversary.

Is this the end of the American Era in the Greater Middle East, or can the decline be reversed – or at least halted – by a renewed focus by the current Administration?   Perhaps, after being frustrated and dominated by the Republicans in Congress (and with domestic policy making hamstrung by the stagnant economy), the White House will seek to make a mark in foreign policy.    This is a pivotal moment for a United States that has been operating without a coherent grand strategy for half a decade.  Let’s hope the Administration siezes the opportunity before any more dominoes fall.
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Iraq security situation crumbling; Libya operation failing

July 30, 2011

via BBC:

A top US adviser on Iraq has accused the US military of glossing over an upsurge in violence, just months before its troops are due to be withdrawn.

Iraq is more dangerous now than a year ago, said a report issued by the US Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Stuart W Bowen Junior.

He said the killing of US soldiers and senior Iraqi figures, had risen, along with attacks in Baghdad .

The report contradicts usually upbeat assessments from the US military.

It comes as Washington is preparing to withdraw its remaining 47,000 troops from Iraq by the end of the year, despite fears that the Iraqi security forces might not be ready to take over fully.

“Iraq remains an extraordinarily dangerous place to work,” Mr Bowen concluded in his quarterly report to Congress. “It is less safe, in my judgment, than 12 months ago.”

The report cited the deaths of 15 US soldiers in June – the bloodiest month for the American military in two years – but also said more Iraqi officials had been assassinated in the past few months than in any other recent period.

I though as recently as a month ago that Barack Obama would be able to campaign in 2012 as the president who got Bin Laden, who deposed Gaddafi, and who presided over the last act of a minor victory in Iraq.   Today, it looks like only the first is a sure thing.  The Libya operation, which should have been a certain victory of grinding attrition, is on the cusp of failure  (see also here, here, here and here)- an unbelievable outcome that seems to require almost willful mismanagement.    Suddenly, the Obama 2012 campaign looks to running on the rails of debt and defeat.   Given the structural advantage of the Democrats in the Electoral College, the powers of incumbency, and the very large Obama war chest, I had long assumed that re-election was inevitable.  As inevitable as a victory in Libya, perhaps?  But there is nothing so certain that it cannot be lost by an incompetent executive.

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The distressing selection of Joe Biden

August 28, 2008

Now that I am finally back to near full strength (even though I am still not eating solid food), it’s past time for a substantive post.  We don’t do partisan or electoral politics on this blog, but we do do energy geopolitics, and there have been some momentous events in the past week that could impact EnerGeoPolitics in the broadest sense, so let’s go.

When I heard through a Vicodin haze last weekend that Obama had named Joe Biden as his VP, I thought I must be halucinating.  Biden, the entrenched insider, seems to be the antithesis of everything the Obama campaign had been preaching about bringing Change to the old Washington ways.  Further, Obama had used his early opposition to the war in Iraq as the  raison d’être of his campaign, and had used it as a sledgehammer against opponents who were not as pure in their opposition.  Now, here he was, selecting as his #2 man someone who, in his (paraphrased) words “had gotten wrong the most important foreign policy question of our generation.”

Of course, Obama is on the cusp of actual leadership, where lobbing critiques from the peanut gallery is a luxury he can no longer afford.  He has to deal with the reality that we are in Iraq, which necessitates moving beyond harping about how we got there and figuring out how to go forward.   His own “immediate withdrawal plan” which he submitted as a Senator was all for show – another peanut gallery grenade that was ultimately unloaded.  His advisors have spoken throughout the campaign of leaving residual forces of 40,000 or 50,000 or 80,000 troops for an unspecified period of time.  Behind the sloganeering, in reality, there is no Obama Plan for leaving Iraq.

But, there is a Biden Plan (actually, there isn’t – it is actually Peter Galbraith’s plan, but in yet another case of the intellectual pilfering for which he is known, Biden has appropriated as his own).  Joe Biden has been a consistent voice calling for the partition of Iraq into three separate federal units based on ethno-religious identity – roughly, a Kurdish north, a Shiite east, and a Sunni west.  Outside of a paniced bug-out from the region, I think this is the worst idea of all that I have heard.

Iraq sits in the center of the Strategic Energy Ellipse.  It is the most under-explored country in that crucial region, meaning the actual size of its immense oil and gas holdings are probably vastly under-reported.  The most important stratetgic objective for the United States in the next half century is to keep the flow of energy resources from this region as unrestricted as possible.  That means preventing the domination of the region by any state or group of states.

The current strength of the US in the region lies in the network of alliances and relationships with other like-minded nations.  Saudi Arabia and the GCC states all fear domination by an Iranian hegemon.  The Central Asian states fear domination by Russia.  The Turks have history with both Russian and Persian imperialism.  Versus Persian and Russian designs, the United States sits as the balancing power.  However, at the moment we begin to show weakness or inability to fulfill our role, all these nations will have incentive to begin making accomodations with one of the other players.  This would have dire consequences for the stability of energy supply and, consequently, to the stability of the global economy.  This is the basic fact underlying US military presence in the region – we have to be there, in one way or another.

The Biden Plan has the potential to seriously damage, if not destroy, many of the alliances the US has in the region.  To begin with, the Turks would be strongly opposed to the independent Kurdistan that the Biden Plan lays the groundwork for.  Next, the Shiite East would likely become a de facto puppet state of Greater Iran, and would probably renege on any oil revenue sharing deals with the other two states.  That would the leave the Sunnis in the west abandoned to a pile of worthless sand.  Our closest and most important allies in the region – the Egyptians, the Saudis, the various states of the GCC – are also primarily Sunni, and would see this as a profound betrayal.  They would also see how much it strengthens Iran and weakens the US – especially if we were to be punished by the Turks by being denied use of our bases there.  The advantages of allying with the US would be fundamentally weakened.

The tripartite separation of Iraq is a monumentally unthoughtful idea.  It begins with the premise of “let’s get out,” and seeks to find a pseudo-intellectual justification or cover for that act.  Leaving aside for now the fact that it would be an exercise in US sanctioned ethnic cleansing, it fails to examine the strategic necessities of the situation first, and to find a way forward from them.  It is ironic that Peter Galbraith said the biggest failure of US strategy in Iraq was “wishful thinking,” and then he went on to put forward this fantasy.

Maybe this is all meaningless, maybe the selection of Joe Biden does not mean an Obama Administration would endorse the Biden Plan.  For certain, realities on the ground have changed much of the tenuous rationale for the plan in the first place, but as of two weeks ago, Biden’s office told Mother Jones that he still fully supported it.  But it is clear that Obama himself does not have a plan for leaving Iraq, and his plan, such as it is, is one of the very few things that Biden really seems to bring to the electoral table.

Distressing.

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The Georgian Crisis and the Threat to the Global Energy Public Good

August 13, 2008

Larry Kudlow over at National Review’s Corner has a post up on the Georgia crisis that has what I think are some important misconceptions. First, you should note that Kudlow mis-attributes to Thomas Barnett a long quote that frames his argument. Barnett did not author the lines he quotes, they came from James Pethokoukis’ keyboard. Pethokoukis was simply referencing Barnett’s line about being “a former expert on the former Soviet Union.”

Pethokoukis’ general idea, I think, is incorrect. Reducing our dependence on energy from odious regimes would matter not a whit, because oil is fungible and we will be held hostage to energy prices no matter where we get it. Our chief sources already are (a) domestic (b) Canada and (c) Mexico. The cost of all that oil will go up whenever the global cost rises and falls.

The way to control those future shocks is to engage globally, not to disengage and try to hide behind an isolationist wall (and a false one, at that) of energy independence.

I’m a geographer, and the geographer’s perspective is usually left out of geopolitical discourse that has come to be dominated by the political half of the word. But, geography is fundamental and the most unchangeable aspect of geopolitics, and we ignore it at our peril. The facts of the matter are that

  • (a) we are fundamentally interconnected with the global economy;
  • (b) the global economy demands vast resources of energy;
  • (c) 70% of the world’s oil reserves and 40% of the natural gas reserves are held in the Strategic Energy Ellipse that stretches from the northern shores of the Caspian Sea to the southern terminus of the Persian Gulf.
  • (d)If we cede control of this region, then we cede control of our economy.

We have in place a superstructure of alliances in the region that we need to leverage to maintain our dominant role as the guarantor of safe and stable energy delivery to the world economy. In opposition to this classic Public Good, the Russians are pursuing a strategy of what I call “Energy Hegemony,” an attempt to dominate those deliveries for private rather than public good, while the Chinese are pursuing a modern form of Oil Mercantilism, seeking to lock up flows of energy for their own use. We cannot allow these private good pursuits to defeat the public good approach. If they do, the world economy as we know it will collapse.

This is the end to which US military power (and all the other forms of soft, sweet and sticky power that various schools champion) must be deployed. It is not about the freedom or democracy of this nation or that people. It is about ensuring the free flow of energy so the best possible environment for economic and political advancement can be maintained.

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Whither NATO?

August 13, 2008

The Bear is once again stalking the woods. Containing that bear is NATO’s raison d’etre. So, where is the NATO response? Unfortunately, our “traditional” NATO allies have been made energy cuckolds by Putin. They will not respond. Meanwhile, the newest NATO members – the Baltic States and Poland – have joined with rebuffed NATO candidate Ukraine to stand bravely with embattled Georgia. If NATO won’t act on this, what is the purpose of maintaining the alliance? Surely not so we can have them sitting behind barriers in Afghanistan, shackled by restrictive rules of engagement.

NATO will not act. It is time for the United States to circumvent them and institute strong bilateral agreements with the Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Then, group those three with current NATO members Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania into a Black Sea Treaty Organization. Turkey controls all of the southern Black Sea shoreline, Bulgaria and Romania control the western shore, Ukraine the north, and Georgia a large portion of the east. Together, they dominate about 7/8 of the sea, leaving just a small area in the northeast that is Russian. The United States already bases aircraft in Turkey, it should redeploy others from the non-helpful NATO allies to each of the other 5 nations (including Azerbaijan on the Caspian) in the region, and dedicate a Black Sea Squadron for permanent basing in the Ukrainian port of Odessa.

The Russians have a decided advantage in land power in the region, but they cannot match US air or naval power. Luckily for us, those are the two branches of the military that are least stretched by Iraq and Afghanistan.

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Russia, Georgia and a Reformulation of Classical Geopolitics

August 12, 2008

A century ago, during the founding years of geopolitics as a discipline, one of the primary concerns was the differences between land powers and maritime powers. American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan stressed the importance of naval power, while a British counterpart, Halford MacKinder, thought the advantage would tip to land power in the near future. MacKinder based his ideas on the developing railroad industry, which, he believed, had the capacity to bring a mobility to the Eurasian land mass which would surpass the mobility on the seas that maritime powers had used to dominate world politics for centuries. A one sentence summary of MacKinder’s position was that trains would trump steamships. Over the next century, MacKinder’s fears were proven to be unfounded, as the maritime powers of Great Britain and the United States have continued to dominate global politics ever since.

But, the old MacKinderian calculus is back in an updated form. Today, it is not the ability to transport troops and arms that is of concern, but the ability to transport energy. Located in the heart of the Eurasian land mass is a region dubbed the Strategic Energy Ellipse, a large swath of land stretching from the northern shores of the Caspian Sea to the southern terminus of the Persian Gulf. Within this region are the world’s largest concentration of energy resources – approximately 70% of the global reserves of crude oil and 40% of natural gas deposits. There are two ways to move these reserves out of this region to the industrial nations hungry for them – land based pipelines or maritime shipping. The United States, with its unchallenged naval might, can guarantee maritime deliveries of energy supplies around the globe, and draws important geopolitical support from many nations for doing so. Some commentators like to call America the world’s “Sheriff,” and believe the world support for US policies come from that strength but, in reality, it is only our ability to keep the energy flowing that allows us the often tenuous support that we get.

Now, for the first time, there is an alternative to the US as guarantor. For the landlocked Central Asian states of the former Soviet Empire, the maritime option is not available, and almost every existing pipeline route must traverse Russia. One of the few routes that does not transit Russia is the pipeline from Azerbaijan through Georgia and into Turkey. A defeated Georgia will make that pipeline Russian dominated as well. Our European allies rely on the energy delivered by these pipelines as much, if not more, than on the energy supplies delivered by tanker. Thus, they are more likely to bend to Russia’s will than to America’s. This is why the Ukraine and Georgia were denied membership in NATO – America wanted it, Russia did not. Russia won.

NATO is the formal structure of the geopolitical idea of Atlanticism - an alliance based on common borders of the Atlantic Ocean. Contra to Atlanticism, Russian geopoliticians have espoused a theory of Eurasianism. With the Russian dominance over Eurasian energy supply, it looks today like Eurasianism is ascendant, and Atlanticism is in decline.

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