Archive for the ‘NATO’ Category

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Norwegion Defense Minister fears NATO is losing capability

January 17, 2012

Despite the apparent success of the Libya intervention, Norwegian Defense Minister Espen Barth Eide fears that the operation actually indicates that the alliance is losing its capability to conduct military operations. 

“Article 5 is not in such a good shape,” said Espen Barth Eide, speaking before an audience assembled at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “I’m not talking about political will, but the actual ability to deliver if something happens in the trans-Atlantic theater of a more classical type of aggression.”

Exercises have shown that NATO’s ability to conduct conventional military operations has markedly declined, Barth Eide said.

Barth Eide is particularly worried about the state of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter due to uncertainties caused by the pending $480 billion cut in US defense budgets.   Many European nations have relied on the aging F-16, which will end its service life at the end of the current decade.   Delays in F-35 production could leave such countries without advanced defense aircraft.  Barth Eide is attempting to create a consortium of such nations to coordinate their F-35 purchases in order to ensure that the production run continues. I have written in the past how the US has managed to use F-35 partnerships and purchases as a geopolitical lever; we must be certain to consider this when making decisions about the future of the weapon system.  We cannot be penny wise and pound foolish – if we are not going to keep our forces on the ground locally, then we must insure that local governments remain tethered to our defense network in other ways, and sophisticated weapons systems are excellent ways of doing so.  Norway, in particular, is an important ally. They intend to purchase not only the F-35, but also AEGIS systems that will form part of the ballistic missile defense network.

Posted in Geopolitics of Weapons Systems, NATO | Leave a Comment »

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Atlantic Council floats idea of US troops in Georgia

October 13, 2011

The Atlantic Council has today released a report titled “Georgia in the West:  A Roadmap to Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic Future.”  A summary at the linked page states:

The report makes recommendations for policymakers in Washington and key European capitals to strengthen Georgia’s ongoing integration into NATO and the European Union, by offering a clear vision and concrete intermediate benefits to reward Georgia’s progress. It offers recommendations for the Georgian government and all sectors of Georgian society to undertake important internal reforms that advance Georgian democracy and in turn secure Georgia’s place in the West. It also lays out strategies to counter Russia’s creeping annexation of the occupied territories and to solidify an international commitment to Georgia’s territorial integrity over the long-term.

Russia sees Georgia as firmly within its own sphere of influence, and any moves by the West to move into the Caucasus via Georgia is likely to antagonize them.  However, two recommendations within this report are certain to draw quick responses from the Russians.  First, the proposal to sell weapons to Georgia; second, the notion of deploying US troops there:

Bolster the US footprint in Georgia. Georgia’s security strategy is premised on deterrence. Any US presence in Georgia helps to augment that deterrence, and just as importantly, reinforces a psychological sense of security among the population. In the absence of formal security guarantees, the United States should augment a small military footprint associated with its: 1) program to train Georgian forces for coalition operations; 2) support to NATO’s Partnership for Peace Training Center; and 3) facilities and logistics to handle transit of forces and equipment from Afghanistan now and, in smaller numbers, in the future, and to serve as a logistics hub for access to Central Asia.

EGP is fully supportive of Atlanticism in general and certainly supports and encourages the expansion of the US geopolitical footprint in the Black Sea and Trans Caucasus regions in particular.  However, this particular set of proposals seems prematurely aggressive.  The Atlantic Alliance is spread thin militarily and its component nations are all in a financial bind – it is unlikely that they could effectively respond to a similarly aggressive Russian response to a move like this.  Also, stripped of its boilerplate idealism about promoting democracy and extending Western institutions, there is next to no geostrategic rationale offered for the need to offer such a commitment to Georgia.  Certainly, such a rationale exists – this blog is partially dedicated to that idea itself.  But, the rationale needs to be debated openly and publicly, not hidden behind the old platitudes about democracy promotion.  In the wake of the Iraq War, the public will not fall for that deception anymore.  This report proposes that we plant a flag on the doorstep of Putin’s Russia and defend it with a US military commitment.  The public needs to know the truth – that the region is a gateway to vast stores of fossil fuels and the domination of that region by a single nation or alliance opposed to our system and values would have devastating consequences.  That is why we were in Iraq, that is why we are interested in Georgia and Azerbaijan.  The world is going to see a global struggle for oil and gas over the next few decades, and the US and the West need to be positioned for that fight.  Democracy promotion is a tool to leverage access to those positions, not the goal itself.

Posted in Atlanticism, Azerbaijan, Caspian Basin, Coalitioning, geopolitics, georgia, Grand Strategy, NATO, Russia, Transcaucasus | Tagged , , , , , | 2 Comments »

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In move to strengthen CSTO, Russia considers kicking out Uzbekistan

September 7, 2011

The CSTO has thus far in its short history proven to be something of a paper tiger.  This is not in Russia’s interests, and a think tank chaired by Russian President Dmitri Medvedev has telegraphed Russia’s goal of making the CSTO into a more muscular organization capable of acting as military force in Central Asia and surrounding regions.  The first step in this process will be to transform the decision making process of the group by moving to simple majority votes and kicking out the sometimes problematic Uzbeks (in essence, making the CSTO even more Russia-centric).  The report also states that the CSTO should seek to work more closely with NATO on shared interests.  Such shared interests are probably temporary and transitory, however, as at their core the two organizations are antipodal – the CSTO is inescapably a Eurasian institution while NATO is the definition of a distributed, maritime, globalist institution.

Posted in Atlanticism, Central Asia, Coalitioning, CSTO, Eurasianism, NATO, Russia | Tagged , , , , | Leave a Comment »

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Roadblock in Azerbaijan/NATO relationship?

June 30, 2011

From Eurasianet:

Azerbaijan’s cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization may not be progressing at a brisk clip, but some local analysts believe that the country’s accession to the Non-Aligned Movement last month put an even bigger question mark over the future of Azerbaijan’s Euro-Atlantic integration.

On May 25, Baku signed on with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a grouping set up in 1955 to oppose “domination” by the world’s “major powers” and colonialism in its various forms. Apart from Belarus and Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan is the only former Soviet republic to have joined the left-leaning organization, a group more closely associated with the Cold War era.

The surprise decision to join forces with NAM prompted criticism from the Azerbaijani opposition that Baku is selling out on closer cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union.  NAM membership requirements state that any “bilateral military agreement with a Great Power” must not be “deliberately concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts.”

Azerbaijan has been one of the most stalwart allies of the United States during the War on Terror, and US support for their NATO membership (and in their disputes with Armenia and former imperial master Russia) was seen as their reward.   Joining the NAM might put that relationship into question. However, the same article also notes that:

Elkhan Shahinoglu, director of the Baku-based Atlas research center, sees another weakness to what he describes as an “illogical” tactic for dealing with Armenia. “Tensions in the South Caucasus are growing and Azerbaijan needs a military alliance with [NATO member] Turkey and deeper cooperation with NATO to ensure its security,” Shahinoglu said. “It does not need neutrality.”

NAM’s criteria about military alliances related to “Great Power” struggles appear flexible, however; Afghanistan and Iraq are both NAM members.

Some Baku analysts, though, still regard this move as an attempt by Azerbaijan to distance itself from NATO and to give itself room for criticizing the alliance. Military analyst Jasur Sumarinli , editor-in-chief of the news agency Mil.az, believes that the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s 90 soldiers from Afghanistan could soon follow.

“The cooperation with NATO will stall even more,” Sumarinli said, adding that Russia’s influence on Azerbaijan, correspondingly, could increase. “Such a decision should not be taken without public and parliamentary debates.”

Azerbaijan’s National Security Concept document lists Euro-Atlantic integration as a “strategic goal.” Yet, unlike neighboring Georgia, which has cast its foreign-policy lot definitively with the West, Azerbaijan has always attempted to balance its interests between NATO, Russia and, to its south, Iran.

Read the whole thing.

 

 

Posted in Azerbaijan, Caspian Basin, Coalitioning, NATO, Transcaucasus | Leave a Comment »

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The Turkey Domino

June 15, 2011

As I have written numerous times in the past (here, here and here for example), the axis of Central Asia – from the Persian Gulf, north through the Caspian Sea, and beyond into the northern regions of Central Russia – is the single most energy rich region of the planet.  Dubbed the Strategic Energy Ellipse, this region contains approximately 70% of the world’s proven oil reserves and 40% of the natural gas reserves (not counting the still-to-be-tallied totals of shale gas).  In a global industrial world that requires vast amounts of energy, it is the ultimate geopolitical object in an era of growing demand and (apparently) shrinking supply.  The map below is a terrific representation of the SEE and its relationship to the major energy consuming regions of the world

The great powers all have vital interests in this region, and there are multiple competing alliance structures in place to support those interests.  The European Union and the United States sponsor multiple NATO partnerships with nations either within the ellipse or along transit routes from the region.  Apart from this, the United States has tried to form a smaller group called the Caspian Guard.  Russia sponsors the Collective Security Treaty Organization, while also partnering with China in a fourth grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.    Of these various groups, I believe that the SCO is the greatest threat to US interests in the region.  All of the groupings are summarized in the table below.

Competing Alliance Structures Within and Around the Strategic Energy Ellipse

Alliance Big Power Sponsor(s) Relevant Members (countries within the SEE or along transit routes)
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Russia, China KazakhstanKyrgyzstan

Tajikstan

Uzbekistan
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Russia ArmeniaBelarusKazakhstanKyrgyzstan

Tajikstan

Uzbekistan
Caspian Guard United States AzerbaijanKazakhstan
NATO Partnerships United States, European Union ArmeniaAzerbaijan

Belarus

Georgia

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Moldava

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Ukraine

Uzbekistan

Turkey has been a long time ally of the United States and an important member of NATO almost from the beginning (NATO was founded in 1949 and Turkey joined in 1952 – three years before core member Germany).  For over half a century, Turkey represented the most powerful presence of the West in general and the United States in particular in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

Over the last decade, however, Turkey has been turning away and looking eastward (Stratfor has an excellent rundown of the deterioration of Turkeys relations with the West here).

Now, China is actively courting a deeper relationship with Turkey, including the possibility of a partial membership in the SCO.  Turkey in the SCO might not by itself present a serious strategic problem  for the United States, but the trajectory of Turkey’s strategic migration is a troubling complication.  If Turkey moves away from the West and develops deeper ties with the Asian powers, a lynchpin of US strategic reach would disappear.

I am not sure what can be done to steer or diminish Turkey’s apparent movement away from the West.  The accommodation counseled by Stratfor is, of course, a wise approach, but it may not be enough.  As an important ally with a strong, diversified (i.e., not petro-based) economy and the most powerful military in the region, the Turks are in position to make demands commensurate with their status.
The AKP looks like it will remain in power for the foreseeable future, and the longer it remains, the deeper the inroads that Islamism will make into the former secular state.  Now, Islamism is not necessarily incompatible with Western political values, but as presently practiced, it is incompatible with the presence of an Israeli state.  As the Turks play the US, China and Russia off of one another, might Israel not become a determining factor?   I believe that the US commitment to Israel is inviolable (I think that is true for the West in general, but I have little faith in the European nations honoring that commitment in the long run), but Russia and China have no such responsibility and will be free to appease any Turkish demands that might arise.

The steady movement of Turkey away from the West will represent the second most important geo-strategic change since the end of the Cold War – the rise of China being the other – and neither one of them works to the benefit of the United States.

Posted in Coalitioning, CSTO, geopolitics, Middle East, NATO, Russia, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Turkey | 3 Comments »

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Russia pulls Ukraine more firmly to its orbit

May 21, 2010

As recently as 2008, Ukraine seemed a sure bet as the next full fledged member of NATO, but those plans have been fully scrapped by Russophile president Viktor Yanukovych.  Since then, a series of deals over the past few weeks have made it clear that Ukraine is no longer a western bastion on the Black Sea, but is once again in the Russian orbit, if not a full client state.  Last month, the two nations struck a deal which allowed the Russian Black Sea Fleet to maintain basing rights in Sevastopol in the Crimea until 2042.  A number of other commercial and border deals have been signed.  Today, the Ukrainian National Gas Union announced an agreement of cooperation with the Russian Natural Gas Society, a possible first step in Vladimir Putin’s stated goal of merging the two nations’ gas industries into one.

Posted in Coalitioning, NATO, Russia, Uncategorized | Leave a Comment »

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Georgia and NATO . . . outlook not so good

May 17, 2010

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is preparing to embrace a new strategic concept for the coming decades.  Today, its “Group of Experts” delivered a report that will likely form the core of that concept, although it has yet to be formally accepted by the Alliance and its members.  Media outlets in Georgia and Eurasia believe that the report embraces a fairly rapid admission of Georgia and Ukraine into the alliance, but I am not so sure.  The report reads to me like it hedges on the question of membership for the Black Sea states, and in fact leans towards keeping the two nations as “partners” and, as such, co-equals with Russia in their relationship to NATO.  Personally, I am in favor of extending the alliance to the shores of the Caspian, with Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan admitted as soon as possible, but my take from the report is that the “experts” are too cautious to tender a full invite even to Ukraine and that Georgia is out of luck and Azerbaijan is not even in the conversation.

Posted in Azerbaijan, Caspian Basin, Central Asia, geopolitics, georgia, NATO, Transcaucasus, Ukraine | Leave a Comment »

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