This month’s National Interest includes a short essay on what authors Raffaello Pantucci and Alexandros Peterson call the “three rival strategies” in Central Asia of competing great powers China, Russia and the United States. There is actually just one strategy – economic development – but the three nations are pursuing different visions from different bases of power with competing goals. It is an interesting essay, but we cannot overlook the military aspect of the contemporary Great Game and the ongoing process of the three powers to create more robust regional alliances that extend into the military realm. At the end of the day, the prize in this version of the Great Game is the same as in the original 19th century formulation: India. India is the key to the future of Central and South Asia (and possibly the world), and all three powers are circling. India has a decades old relationship with Russia, it shares a common heritage with the United States, and has a history of conflict with China. I would expect India to avoid a too-close entanglement with any of the three but to continue to foster better relations with Russia and the US to maintain alliance options as China continues to rise.
Archive for the ‘Grand Strategy’ Category
Does the US need a Grand Strategy
January 30, 2012No, it does not, argues Harry Kazianis at The Diplomat.
Although I agree with Kazianis on some of his points (in particular, on the Obama administration’s mostly deft geostrategic pivoting toward the Indian and Western Pacific oceans), I have to disagree with his conclusion that US security needs are too complex for a grand strategy (and, also, that previous editions of grand strategy were ever as simplistic as the bumper sticker slogans to which he reduces them).
In my opinion, there is no question that the US needs a grand strategy. I believe that US grand strategy has always been in the service of two American ideals: Liberty and Prosperity, which mutually reinforce one another. I also believe that the levels of Liberty and Prosperity which the US has enjoyed for the past 2 centuries are a direct result of the cyclical 500 year old, Western dominated World Economic System. That system requires a powerful leader (hegemon) in order to maintain its stability. For most of the past five centuries, those hegemons have been (in succession) the Dutch, the British and the Americans. Each, in turn, has maintained internally the wold’s most open political and economic systems as well as the world’s predominant naval power. And, each has been challenged by large, powerful land-based powers that presented relatively more closed political and economic orders. In order for the World System to keep operating – to keep providing Prosperity and protecting Liberty – the US must either remain hegemon or work to enable a similarly open successor. I do not see a successor on the near horizon (although I do believe that India can assume that role in the future), so the US must commit to maintaining global hegemony in the face of the challenge presented by China.
That, in my opinion, should be the foundation of US grand strategy. To “put it on a post it note,” as Kazianis dismissively requests, it is this: Recognize and maintain the existence and the essential qualities of the World System. Everything in support of that are just questions of operations and tactics.
Terror as geostrategic lever
January 24, 2012Geopolitically, Pakistan is hemmed in between Iran to its west and India to its east. In India, it has what it believes to be a mortal enemy with which it has been at various levels of war since independence; in Iran, it has a rival for leadership in the Islamic world. Pakistani leaders would like their nation to be the center of a pan-Islamic quasi-Caliphate to balance the growing power of India. To that end, it’s Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence has built what some call “an empire of terror” throughout the nations of Central Asia. ISI has a in every pie, with the dual goals of thwarting other Islamic nations for leadership (Iran and, increasingly, Turkey) plus building a deterrent for India. Window on the Heartland has recently posted an overview of Pakistan’s use of terror as a geostrategic lever:
Pakistan has always desired to expand its influence in Afghanistan and beyond. Central Asia is seen as an area of natural expansion for the country. Islamabad’s objectives in the region are determined by its geopolitical imperative: to turn itself into the leader of an Islamic bloc stretching from the Black Sea to China able to counter India’s influence and become an autonomous actor on the international scene. In this context, the destabilizing efforts carried out by the ISI through support to terrorist groups in Central Asia since the early 90s have been aimed at creating the right conditions so that the Pakistani leadership could gradually take over from of other major powers such as Russia, China and the United States.
Read the whole thing.
The ISI has built what is in essence a model for a low-tech, asymmetric analog to the integrated defense network centered on complex weapons systems that the US is building.
Containing China even as she peaks
November 17, 2011It is my belief that, while it continues to be a major economic force and will challenge US supremacy in the coming decades, China’s long term potential is at or near its peak. Like a supertanker that takes a long time to turn, this peak may not be evident for awhile, and policy makers will continue to make moves as if China is still, inevitably, rising. Still, the signs that China has peaked are around. Yesterday, there was a report that a major Chinese economist had made a secret speech claiming that many of China’s financial numbers are fabricated and that, in fact, the nation is close to bankruptcy. Today, it is Amitai Etzioni at National Interest, with an essay on the Overblown Fears About China’s Rise.
Of course, this does not mean that China is suddenly rendered impotent. Indeed, as they recognize their peak, they may become more dangerous, knowing that their moment is slipping away. For that reason, the US will still attend to its coalitioning moves, strengthening ties with allies surrounding China. Earlier this week, we noted the moves to share the advanced F-35 aircraft withIndia and Japan. Yesterday, it was announced that the US would establish a naval presence in Northern Australia. These moves are not just aimed at China, but also at the various nations of the Southern Asian periphery that have concerns about China. A US presence in the region serves to bring many of them into our orbit, as analysts in India have already noted:
The US move to create a naval base in northern Australia close to the South China Sea can actually mean more dollars in the Indian kitty, and put more strategic and business opportunities in New Delhi’s way, sources said. The first piece of evidence has come by way of Australia’s decision to sell uranium to India.
The US move will provide a sense of protection to East Asian countries including Japan, who have serious conflicts with China but buy vast amounts of Chinese goods. The new found protection will encourage East Asia to reduce its dependence on China for goods and enhance economic ties with India, sources said.
“Japan, Vietnam and Indonesia will feel more secure. India and Indonesia can get together to control the Malacca Straits, which is the route though which 90% of Chinese goods to East Asia passes,” Subramanian Swamy, Janata Party president and a widely regarded China expert, told TNN.
I have not agreed with everything they have done (especially the failure to maximize the strategic domestic energy resources), but this is a very strong move by the Obama Administration.
India frontier governor calls China “major military threat”
November 4, 2011Himachal Pradesh is a far northern Indian state, nestled high in the Himalayan mountains and sharing a border with Chinese occupied Tibet. The governor of Himachal Pradesh is concerned about Chinese militarization of its far west regions. China and India have already fought one war (the 1962 Sino-Indian War) and several skirmishes over their ill defined borders in the Himalayan region, and as China continues to militarize the high altitude regions, Chief Minister Prem Kumar Dhumal fears a replay of the unpreparedness that led to defeat in the 1962 war:
Speaking at the National Development Council (NDC) meeting here, Dhumal said “India faces a major military threat from neighboring China and the Indian Army should be made fully capable of fighting in the tough terrain hilly regions. And with this objective a separate army regiment drawn from youths of hilly areas should be set up in the army so as its soldiers are well conversant with tough geography and topography of the region and are also prepared mentally and physically to encounter the enemy in this region”, Dhumal said. He requested the central government to make suitable provision for setting up the Himlayan Regiment in the 12th Plan.
US forces, with a decade of experience of high altitude combat, would be uniquely qualified to aid Indian in the training of the Himalayan Regiment. This would be an excellent opportunity for the US to deepen and strengthen our relationship with India
US searching for new Strategic Ellipse approach
October 31, 2011The long time American military commitment to the Persian Gulf region will not end when US forces leave Iraq at the end of 2011. There is already word that the Pentagon and Obama Administration are preparing to beef up the American military presence in the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. This is almost farcical. One of the major issues put forth by Osama bin Laden in his original fatwa against the US was the presence of “infidel” military forces in Saudi Arabia, home of Islams two most holy cities. One of the great benefits of the Iraq war was that, by removing Saddam Hussein’s perpetual threat to the Gulf oil fields, it allowed the US to remove its forces from Saudi Arabia, and in so doing to remove a driving force for jihad against America. Now, due to what seems like blind disregard, the US will be forced to redeploy military forces to the Land of the Two Mosques. What was one of the few clear benefits of the Iraq War is being tossed away. This just sets us up for another generation of radicals with a clear grievance against the US to emerge . . . we are right back where we started.
In the other theater of the rapidly ending War on Terror, the State Department has launched the “New Silk Road” initiative to fill the gap as the US military mission to Afghanistan winds down. On paper, this seems like a good idea, but Americans have had a number of good ideas on paper. The Bug Pit points out that most people in the region believe this effort will prove to be “unfeasible . . . and so not worth worrying too much about.” And, if it does turn out to be feasible, it does not appear from published statements that State has not game planned for what would be a robust Russian response.
I think a New Silk Road is a promising strategy, but it has to have real support. It would help if there was a general foreign policy consensus in the US that bridged various administrations, as containment of the Soviet Union did for so long. I humbly submit that an awareness of Long Cycle Theory in general and EnerGeoPolitcs in particular might go a long way toward creating that consensus. We are nearing the endpoint of the current phase, probably within 20-30 years, and the coalitioning ahead of that macrodecision is occurring now, whether we actively acknowledge it or not.
Must America prepare to “manage” it’s decline?
October 20, 2011so argues Gideon Rachman at the Financial Times:
Those who refuse to entertain any discussion of decline actually risk accelerating the process. A realistic acknowledgement that America’s position in the world is under threat should be a spur to determined action on everything from educational reform to the budget deficit. The endless politicking in Washington reflects a certain complacency – a belief that America’s position as number one is so impregnable that it can afford self-indulgent episodes such as the summer’s near-debt default.
I largely agree with Rachman, although I differ with him greatly on the particulars. Rachman points to Britain’s “managed decline” from global hegemon following World War II, a position made easier by the fact that they were handing leadership over to a very similar United States. I concur with this analogy; indeed, only last month, I mentioned that the US should prepare a “strategy of graceful decline” by forging ties with and handing leadership over to India. My opinion is based on my theoretical foundation of Long Cycle Theory. I believe that we are nearing the end of the current cycle and that there will be some sort of “macro decision” (which meant world war in previous cycles) in the next 25 to 30 years. That competition probably will mainly be between the US and China (and various allies on either side). At the end of previous cycles, the new emergent hegemon has always been a relatively open society, committed to commerce and a relatively free market, and a maritime power. I believe that, at some point, India will meet those requirements.
However, returning to the British analogy, we must note that the British earned not one, but two terms as world leader. And, although I think India has leadership in its future, I do not necessarily think that it will be the next leader. Of all the contenders, the United States still best suits the role, and could very easily earn its own “second term.” That would give India the rest of the century to develop its economy, build and strengthen its civil institutions , and put its fleets to sea.
copyright EnerGeoPolitics, 2010
In summary, I don’t think it is absolutely necessary for the US to “manage” it’s decline – that is too precipitous a step. Rather, policy makers must recognize our relative decline and strategize accordingly. I do believe that means forging a strong relationship with India (and all the other maritime states of the Outer Crescent – as well as those on the fringe of the Inner Crescent), and I do believe that means preparing for a time when US hegemony may be relinquished, but I also believe that there is a good chance that changing of the guard will not come until late in this – or even into the next – century.
Atlantic Council floats idea of US troops in Georgia
October 13, 2011The Atlantic Council has today released a report titled “Georgia in the West: A Roadmap to Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic Future.” A summary at the linked page states:
The report makes recommendations for policymakers in Washington and key European capitals to strengthen Georgia’s ongoing integration into NATO and the European Union, by offering a clear vision and concrete intermediate benefits to reward Georgia’s progress. It offers recommendations for the Georgian government and all sectors of Georgian society to undertake important internal reforms that advance Georgian democracy and in turn secure Georgia’s place in the West. It also lays out strategies to counter Russia’s creeping annexation of the occupied territories and to solidify an international commitment to Georgia’s territorial integrity over the long-term.
Russia sees Georgia as firmly within its own sphere of influence, and any moves by the West to move into the Caucasus via Georgia is likely to antagonize them. However, two recommendations within this report are certain to draw quick responses from the Russians. First, the proposal to sell weapons to Georgia; second, the notion of deploying US troops there:
Bolster the US footprint in Georgia. Georgia’s security strategy is premised on deterrence. Any US presence in Georgia helps to augment that deterrence, and just as importantly, reinforces a psychological sense of security among the population. In the absence of formal security guarantees, the United States should augment a small military footprint associated with its: 1) program to train Georgian forces for coalition operations; 2) support to NATO’s Partnership for Peace Training Center; and 3) facilities and logistics to handle transit of forces and equipment from Afghanistan now and, in smaller numbers, in the future, and to serve as a logistics hub for access to Central Asia.
EGP is fully supportive of Atlanticism in general and certainly supports and encourages the expansion of the US geopolitical footprint in the Black Sea and Trans Caucasus regions in particular. However, this particular set of proposals seems prematurely aggressive. The Atlantic Alliance is spread thin militarily and its component nations are all in a financial bind – it is unlikely that they could effectively respond to a similarly aggressive Russian response to a move like this. Also, stripped of its boilerplate idealism about promoting democracy and extending Western institutions, there is next to no geostrategic rationale offered for the need to offer such a commitment to Georgia. Certainly, such a rationale exists – this blog is partially dedicated to that idea itself. But, the rationale needs to be debated openly and publicly, not hidden behind the old platitudes about democracy promotion. In the wake of the Iraq War, the public will not fall for that deception anymore. This report proposes that we plant a flag on the doorstep of Putin’s Russia and defend it with a US military commitment. The public needs to know the truth – that the region is a gateway to vast stores of fossil fuels and the domination of that region by a single nation or alliance opposed to our system and values would have devastating consequences. That is why we were in Iraq, that is why we are interested in Georgia and Azerbaijan. The world is going to see a global struggle for oil and gas over the next few decades, and the US and the West need to be positioned for that fight. Democracy promotion is a tool to leverage access to those positions, not the goal itself.
China, India at odds over South China Sea oil
September 29, 2011India’s state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Company (ONGC) announced yesterday that it has signed a deal with Vietnam to develop off shore sites in the South China Sea. The announcement was met with an immediate response from the Chinese Foreign Ministry:
As for oil and gas exploration activities, our consistent position is that we are opposed to any country engaged in oil and gas exploration and development activities in waters under China’s jurisdiction. We hope foreign countries do not get involved in the South China Sea dispute.
China makes vast claims to sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, based on what they term as “ancient” rights. As the map below demonstrates, the Chinese claims overlap those of every other nation bordering the oil-rich sea (Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia). Vietnam makes the next largest claim in the region, claiming an area extending out 200 miles from their coastline based on the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Seas.
This is not the first run-in between China and India over the South China Sea – last summer, a Chinese naval vessel confronted an Indian navy ship in Vietnamese waters, and just two weeks ago, China issued a formal warning to all nations that it considered the SCS its “indisputable” property. China also had brief naval run-ins with both Vietnam and Philippines this summer.
China also sees an American hand behind India’s push into the SCS. “As a South Asian country, India actively takes part in East Asian issues through the support of the US, which has been advocating for Asian countries to counter China. The US takes every opportunity to counter China, and its joint military maneuvers with Japan and other regional countries have been more frequent in recent years,” Chinese think-tanker Wu Xinbo told the Global Times.
Personally, I don’t believe the US is “pushing” India at all. India’s natural growth and needs – and wariness of China – provide all the necessary impetus. Although, as I have written before, the United States should seek to encourage and foster India’s growth as a world power, as we have much in common as the world’s two largest democracies and as flowers from the same tree of British liberal tradition. While it is in no one’s interest to see a war break out in the vital sea lanes of the SCS, and the US should thus seek to soothe both sides rather than inflame them, it is certainly in the long term interest of the US to ally with a growing Indian maritime presence.
Has the US been defeated in Afghanistan by Pakistan?
September 27, 2011Rajeev Srinivasan presents in this article a very harsh and stinging analysis of the US adventure in Afghanistan from an Indian point of view. The author claims that the Pakistani intelligence service, ISI, has mastered “the fine art of running with the hares while hunting with the hounds” and has twisted the US to its own strategic goals (while bamboozling successive US administrations into paying for its own defeat). Srinivasan writes:
In effect, the only ones who have benefited from the collapse of American clout are the Arabs, the Pakistanis and the Chinese. The Arabs, especially the oil-exporting dictatorships (with the sole exception of Libya) have managed to maintain their status quo ante, and they have parlayed the billions from an oil-addicted world into radicalised millions everywhere through insistent propaganda.
The Pakistanis have achieved their coveted ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan which is, in effect, their colony. True, there has been some cost to them in civilian casualties and the Frankenstein monster of internal terrorism, but that is collateral damage the Army is willing to accept in the pursuit of their strategic goals.
The unkindest cut is perhaps that China has won against the Americans. Again. This is the third military conflict where China has had the better of the Americans. In Korea, they fought to a standstill. In Vietnam, a then-Chinese ally defeated the Americans. In Afghanistan, Chinese ally Pakistan is doing this. This must be China’s dream come true: they are beating the Americans militarily and economically.
Srinivasan, again, is writing from the Indian point of view and ponders the question of what India should do going forward. If I might interject my American point of view, I believe that India and the US have deeply shared interests not only in Central, South and Southwest Asia, but globally as well. I believe that India, because of its democratic heritage, relatively open society, and latent power (both hard and soft) is destined to succeed the US as global hegemon, if not at the end of the current cycle, then certainly by the end of this century when the sixth cycle closes. Just as the British handed off hegemony to the US during the last century, the United States should build deep ties with India, begin a strategy of “graceful decline,” and prepare to hand off global leadership to India. The US can play a supporting role to Indian hegemony not unlike the one that Great Britain played for the US. It is the current world system of open markets and democratic nations that best provides security and prosperity, and this is the best means of maintaining that system.
New CNA report: China’s emergence as a maritime power
September 26, 2011CNA’s China Studies division has issued a new report examining various aspects of China’s drive to build a more robust naval presence in the Western Pacific. From the abstract:
China is an emerging maritime actor with expanding interests in security at sea. As a consequence, the capabilities of Chinese maritime security forces are improving, missions for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) are expanding, new actors and bureaucratic interests are emerging, and some observers feel that China is now more willing to challenge the interests of others in the maritime domain. CNA has undertaken this study to provide strategic-level context in order to foster discussion and debate about China’s maritime rise and its implications.
The United States has not faced a near-peer competitor, neither globally nor in local strategic regions, since the fall of the Soviet Union (and, arguably, not since the defeat of Imperial Japan over six decades ago). The rise of China represents a new challenge for both nations – for China, the challenge of building and mastering a naval warfare presence; for the US, the challenge of competing in a vital strategic region without clear and unquestioned naval dominance. This includes the need for a geo-strategic pivot of the US order of battle in the Western Pacific region.
US facing major geo-strategic repositioning in Western Pacific
September 22, 2011For sixty years, US forces in the Western Pacific region have been centered on the NorthEast Asia and the threat of North Korea. The US military maintains a very large footprint in South Korea and Japan. However, with the rise of China and the growing concerns over Chinese expansionism among their neighbors in the South China Sea region, the US is facing a need to re-orient its forces southward over the next decade. Robert Haddick at the Council on Foreign Relations has a good introduction to the issues facing the US as it seeks to create a credible force without building permanent bases that would inflame the situation. It is a delicate situation, as any increased US involvement is met with stern Chinese warnings. The decision to upgrade Taiwan’s F-16 fleet (rather than selling them new planes, as they desired), was made to mollify the Chinese. Future relations with regional forces in Vietnam and the Philippines will be as delicate, if not more so.
Many defense analysts believe that China’s middle term goal is to project power out to, if not beyond, what the Chinese call “the second island chain) in the Pacific Ocean. Within that chain, China would be the dominant if not hegemonic power.
The Second Island Chain, it must be noted, includes the US territories of Guam and the Northern Marianas Islands. I believe the US should extend statehood to these territories (as a single combined unit) in order to make clear to both current and prospective allies (as well as the Chinese themselves) that the US is and will remain a permanent fixture in the Western Pacific.
European Grand Strategy
September 14, 2011James Rogers, Ph.D. candidate at Cambridge, presents a diagram of the strategic and security considerations that inform the developing pan-European grand strategic concept:
I would note two things. First, although Rogers has a sphere representing Atlanticism (the Atlantic Alliance in the lower right quadrant), he does not acknowledge the countervailing (if still nascent) force of Russian Eurasianism under Putin. Along those lines, to me, the obviously missing piece here is great power conflict. All possible peer or near-peer competitors with Europe are grouped as either Strategic Partners (BRIC) or true allies (US). Russia has already signaled a willingness to play upon Europe’s energy dependency (which Rogers does note in the upper left quadrant) and to use it’s “energy weapon;” while China is locking up exclusive energy rights across the globe. Energy is the lifeblood of both industry and modern agriculture, and the need to maintain access to it is more than a “post modern weakness,” it is a likely source of significant future conflict.
First Chinese Aircraft Carrier to set sail today
August 9, 2011Via Andrew Erickson . . . as Erickson notes, it is not time to worry yet. The US has a big lead but it is early in the game and China is chipping away. Pentagon needs to get serious about defense priorities. Even with looming cuts, there is enough money to secure US interests if they are prioritized. Maintaining naval supremacy should be at the top of the list.
Crunching the defense cuts in the debt deal
August 1, 2011Chris Preble at Cato looks at the potential cuts to the defense budget that are giving some hawks second thoughts about the debt deal. In short, there are a maximum of $850 billion in potential cuts over the next ten years. In that same time, we will spend over $6 trillion on defense. I submit that we can certainly defend the nation with $5 trillion dollars, but we will need to get serious about identifying priorities and crafting a coherent and forward looking grand strategy to do so (as touched upon in our previous post).
Preble’s key grafs:
The Pentagon’s budget has more than doubled over the past decade, and current projections call for the Pentagon to receive more than $6 trillion from U.S. taxpayers through 2021. If its budget got cut by 15 percent, that would return us to roughly 2007 levels. That hardly seems like “gutting“. After such cuts, we would still account for more than 40 percent of global military spending, and our margin of military superiority over any combination of rivals would remain unrivaled.
The focus should now shift to strategy. The White House says the Pentagon’s ongoing roles and missions review will guide the first round of security cuts. The aim is to eliminate military capabilities that are unnecessary or provided by multiple services. We should go deeper, looking to what missions, allies, and possible wars, we can jettison. The recommendations should guide not only the first set of cuts, but also the second. That means making recommendations for the Joint Committee on additional defense cuts and preparing for automatic cuts should they occur. There is nothing preventing those cuts from being achieved by retiring force structure required by needless missions—such as defending rich allies that can defend themselves.
We should also keep in mind that this deal hardly solves our deficit problem and does not exhaust the possible savings we should seek. Deeper military cuts are possible and could even enhance security given the right strategy.
The Obama Dominoes
August 1, 2011I wrote over the weekend how the situation in Iraq is suddenly crumbling while the (what should have been) certain victory in Libya is also slipping away. The Obama Administration is preparing the ground for a withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Arab Spring has swept away our longtime ally Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. Turkey is turning its back on secularism, and casting eyes toward our rivals Russia and China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. With American power and prestige in the region in obvious decline, even the linchpin of American strategy in the region – stalwart ally Saudi Arabia – is seeking an entente with our regional nemesis, Iran. From Stratfor lst month: Something extraordinary, albeit not unexpected, is happening in the Persian Gulf region. The United States, lacking a coherent strategy to deal with Iran and too distracted to develop one, is struggling to navigate Iraq’s fractious political landscape in search of a deal that would allow Washington to keep a meaningful military presence in the country beyond the end-of-2011 deadline stipulated by the current Status of Forces Agreement. At the same time, Saudi Arabia, dubious of U.S. capabilities and intentions toward Iran, appears to be inching reluctantly toward an accommodation with its Persian adversary.
The Afghanistan Withdrawal
June 23, 2011Short take: We support it. To us, Afghanistan only made sense in conjunction with Iraq. The two operations together brought the US a ring of allies and operational bases in Central Asia and the Persian Gulf that allowed a physical containment of Iran. We have argued for years that should have always been the larger geopolitical objective. Absent that, the operation in Afghanistan should have been a punishment operation meant to shatter al Qaeda on the ground, but with no need for a long term commitment to the nation.
Once the Iraq project was largely abandoned and other US allies in the region began dropping away, an Afghanistan commitment no longer made any sense.
To be clear, we advocated a very long term commitment to both nations, with permanent US military bases as part of a vast regional network. However, the moment to seize that opportunity passed in 2008. A strategy based on a large physical presence in Central/Southwest Asia is no longer in the cards, so it is best to redeploy as quickly as possible. Redeploy to where is the question. Neither American political party has articulated a Grand Strategy for the next decade, although people like Daniel Drezner are hard at work trying to piece one together from the various loose strands lying around.
