Archive for the ‘geopolitics’ Category
February 2, 2012
One of the earliest theoretical disputes in classical geopolitics was the relative value of sea power vs. land power. Alfred T. Mahan was a proponent of the primacy of sea power, while Halford MacKinder believed that if any nation was able to obtain primacy in the Eurasion heartland, then the corresponding landpower would overwhelm the advantages of seapower.
From the perspective of Long Cycle Theory, the conflicts of the modern world system have always been between a sea power and a land power – and the dominant power has always been the nation that can rule the waves.
Nor is this dichotomy is not limited to Anglo American perspectives on geopolitics and hegemonic power. Russian geopolitical theorist Aleksander Dugin argues that it is the core of international conflict (he uses the terms “thalassocracy” for sea power and “telluocracy” for land power) and, in a geographically deterministic conclusion, contends that the two different positions create profound cultural differences that will always be in conflict.
In the original dispute between Mahan and MacKinder, the latter feared that the connecting of the Eurasion Heartland via a network of railroads would give the land power a mobility equal to or surpassing that of the naval powers; that a land power would be able to project power as efficiently as formerly only sea power could, and that would allow a nation to dominate all of Asia and bring its vast resources to bear in creating an inexorable global empire.
Today, the Eurasian Heartland and its vast resources are once again the field of contest among great powers. The technology brought to bear has changed, however. Whereas a century ago, it was railroads pitted against battleships, today it is pipelines vs. super tankers. The resource of primary interest in Central Asia is energy – oil and natural gas resources that the energy-dependent economies of the world hunger and thirst for. The pipelines would seem to have the upper hand, as described in the purple prose of Pepe Escobar, who foresees a MacKinderian nightmare of an Asia integrated on energy trading that he dubs “Pipelineistan.”
Escobar’s vision would be a nightmare development for the West. Europe would be dependent on Russia for energy and the United States would be marginalized. It is through this lens that Escobar understands US military and foreign policy, and he may be correct. But, the shale revolution may completely reshuffle the deck. The gas bonanza that hydraulic fracturing promises would collapse the price structure on which the intricate network of pipelines depends; it is conceivable that, within 25 years, the United States could at once become the world’s greatest consumer, producer and exporter of energy. The Pipelineistan behemoth would be stillborne, and the US would remain the world’s greatest power. All that such an outcome requires are the proper policy decisions in Washington, DC over the next decade.
Posted in energy geopolitics, Eurasianism, geopolitics, Long Cycle Theory | Tagged Dugin, MacKinder, Mahan, Pepe Escobar | Leave a Comment »
January 24, 2012
Geopolitically, Pakistan is hemmed in between Iran to its west and India to its east. In India, it has what it believes to be a mortal enemy with which it has been at various levels of war since independence; in Iran, it has a rival for leadership in the Islamic world. Pakistani leaders would like their nation to be the center of a pan-Islamic quasi-Caliphate to balance the growing power of India. To that end, it’s Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence has built what some call “an empire of terror” throughout the nations of Central Asia. ISI has a in every pie, with the dual goals of thwarting other Islamic nations for leadership (Iran and, increasingly, Turkey) plus building a deterrent for India. Window on the Heartland has recently posted an overview of Pakistan’s use of terror as a geostrategic lever:
Pakistan has always desired to expand its influence in Afghanistan and beyond. Central Asia is seen as an area of natural expansion for the country. Islamabad’s objectives in the region are determined by its geopolitical imperative: to turn itself into the leader of an Islamic bloc stretching from the Black Sea to China able to counter India’s influence and become an autonomous actor on the international scene. In this context, the destabilizing efforts carried out by the ISI through support to terrorist groups in Central Asia since the early 90s have been aimed at creating the right conditions so that the Pakistani leadership could gradually take over from of other major powers such as Russia, China and the United States.
Read the whole thing.
The ISI has built what is in essence a model for a low-tech, asymmetric analog to the integrated defense network centered on complex weapons systems that the US is building.
Posted in Central Asia, geopolitics, Grand Strategy, Pakistan | Tagged geopolitics, geostrategy, India, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey | Leave a Comment »
November 17, 2011
It is my belief that, while it continues to be a major economic force and will challenge US supremacy in the coming decades, China’s long term potential is at or near its peak. Like a supertanker that takes a long time to turn, this peak may not be evident for awhile, and policy makers will continue to make moves as if China is still, inevitably, rising. Still, the signs that China has peaked are around. Yesterday, there was a report that a major Chinese economist had made a secret speech claiming that many of China’s financial numbers are fabricated and that, in fact, the nation is close to bankruptcy. Today, it is Amitai Etzioni at National Interest, with an essay on the Overblown Fears About China’s Rise.
Of course, this does not mean that China is suddenly rendered impotent. Indeed, as they recognize their peak, they may become more dangerous, knowing that their moment is slipping away. For that reason, the US will still attend to its coalitioning moves, strengthening ties with allies surrounding China. Earlier this week, we noted the moves to share the advanced F-35 aircraft withIndia and Japan. Yesterday, it was announced that the US would establish a naval presence in Northern Australia. These moves are not just aimed at China, but also at the various nations of the Southern Asian periphery that have concerns about China. A US presence in the region serves to bring many of them into our orbit, as analysts in India have already noted:
The US move to create a naval base in northern Australia close to the South China Sea can actually mean more dollars in the Indian kitty, and put more strategic and business opportunities in New Delhi’s way, sources said. The first piece of evidence has come by way of Australia’s decision to sell uranium to India.
The US move will provide a sense of protection to East Asian countries including Japan, who have serious conflicts with China but buy vast amounts of Chinese goods. The new found protection will encourage East Asia to reduce its dependence on China for goods and enhance economic ties with India, sources said.
“Japan, Vietnam and Indonesia will feel more secure. India and Indonesia can get together to control the Malacca Straits, which is the route though which 90% of Chinese goods to East Asia passes,” Subramanian Swamy, Janata Party president and a widely regarded China expert, told TNN.
I have not agreed with everything they have done (especially the failure to maximize the strategic domestic energy resources), but this is a very strong move by the Obama Administration.
Posted in Coalitioning, geopolitics, Grand Strategy, Peak China | Tagged Australia, China, F35, geopolitics, India, Peak China | Leave a Comment »
November 15, 2011
India is preparing a major new purchase of fighter aircraft, and has spent years evaluating six major contenders. Recently, the field was narrowed to two – the French Rafaele and the Eurofighter Typhoon. In the original competition, the US fielded two different competitors – the F-16 and the F-18 (the other early contenders were Saab’s Gripen and Russia’s Mig-29). However, the US is apparently not entirely out of the competition just yet. The US is trying to interest India in the new F-35, our second most advanced fighter. The F-35 was not under initial consideration because it’s cost puts it outside the parameters of India’s initial goal, and also it was not thought that it would be available in the time frame that India prefers. However, the US may be willing to subsidize the price and to sweeten the deal by developing and building some of the components in joint ventures with Indian contractors.
The F-35 would certainly be the most capable of all the contenders, and might be uniquely configured for India’s needs because of its short and vertical take off capabilities (although the S-VTOL versions will not be available for several more years).
As The Diplomat points out, this is more than a simple aircraft supply bid. India will be a key player in the geopolitics of the 21st century, and the US is keen to foster a deep military relationship there. To contain any threat of an aggressive China, the US needs to organize the nations of the Asian periphery, of which India is key. For that reason, the F-35 is also being offered to Japan. India and Japan would join longtime US allies Australia, has been a participant in the program from the beginning, and Singapore, which has been participating since 2003.
Posted in Coalitioning, geopolitics, India | Tagged coalitioning, F35, Geopolitics of Weapons Systems, India | 1 Comment »
October 27, 2011
Last year, the USGS assessed the potential energy bounty of billions of barrels of oil and trillions of cubic feet of natural gas in the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean, primarily around Israel. Since its inception, Israel has had the misfortune of being one of the very few Middle Eastern nations without massive energy reserves. This discovery would change the character of Israel both economically and strategically. Not only would there be enough oil and gas to power the nation, but the potential to export resources to energy hungry Europe would not only bring in foreign revenues, but also fundamentally change a number of dependency relationships.
However, Israeli-Turkish relations have been on the decline (since before this discovery, but more rapidly since then). Now, Turkey has taken things a step further, announcing that Turkey would block any Israeli access to European markets via the pipeline network that transits Turkey:
Turkey will not permit the transit of natural gas produced in Israel, linking the rejection to the present state of relations between the two nations. Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz said Turkey has turned down requests private firms to allow the transit of natural gas produced in Israel through Turkey to Europe.
Turkish-Israeli relations have been tense since the attack on a Gaza-bound flotilla on May 30, 2010 that killed nine Turkish nationals. In very blunt terms, Yildiz stated: “Had not nine of our nationals been murdered, there could be major developments in the energy distribution in the Mediterranean Sea. [Then] we would not have rejected the demand by private firms,” he said on Friday.
The Minister’s comments also reflect adverserial positions on the contested drilling by Cyprus in the Levant Basin of Mediterranean Sea.
The flotilla deaths are a cover, IMO, for a hard nosed geopolitical calculation. Turkey seeks to dominate the Eastern Mediterranean militarily and economically. It needs to weaken Israel in both realms, and as an aside, probably has its own designs on the energy resources.
Posted in geopolitics, Israel, natural gas, oil, Turkey | Tagged geopolitics, Israel, natural gas, Turkey | Leave a Comment »
October 21, 2011
Plamen Plantev argues that various exogenous factors – from the global financial crisis to the “Arab Spring” to the breakdown of Turkish/Israeli relations have led to a stagnation of geopolitical activity in the Black Sea region. The region is still of great geopolitical import, Plantev, notes, but is currently of little strategic interest from outside players whose attention is focused elsewhere.
I am not so sure. The Atlantic Council recently made news with its proposal for sending US troops to Georgia, while the US is building its missile defense system with a base in Romania and a radar array in Turkey. Indeed, as the Coalitioning phase of the current cycle continues, I believe that alliances with the nations of Ukraine, Turkey and the various Trans Caucusus states are considered prizes of importance by the great powers jockeying for position.
Posted in Coalitioning, geopolitics | Tagged Black Sea, coalitioning, geopolitics | Leave a Comment »
October 19, 2011
At its core, geopolitics is the analysis of spatial competition between nation states. Geoeconomics is a subset of geopolitics or, alternately, a softer version of geopolitics – the same spatial competition stripped of the hard (or, at least, harder) power aspects.
Within both realms, however, are not just competition but cooperation. Paolo Sorbello at e-International Relations provides an account of Russo/Kazakh cooperation on development of the Kurmangazy oil field in the Caspian Sea:
This quick account of Russo-Kazakh relations over the Kurmangazy oilfield is a good case in point in order to understand more complex dynamics that have characterized the relations between Moscow and Astana in the last ten years. Vacillations, misunderstandings, compromises, and accords followed each other during leading governmental meetings. Energy has played a peculiar role as the starter of the diplomatic dialogue and remained a cardinal foundation among the parties and in their relations with the exterior, as well as the other Caspian states, the EU, China, and the USA.
It might turn out that Kurmangazy will not yield as much oil as foreseen. In spite of this scenario, it is very probable that Russia and Kazakhstan will remain close, will continue to talk on energy matters, and will collaborate on current and new exploration projects. Thus, soft power aspect of the energy becomes highly relevant in both countries’ foreign policy decision-making. Thinking traditionally, in such countries, the hegemony of the executive on the other powers would lead one to predict the opposite. Therefore, it becomes necessary to start including the energy variable in geopolitical analyses in a more systematic and consistent way.
Posted in Caspian Basin, energy geopolitics, geoeconomics, geopolitics, Kazakhstan, new discovery, Russia | Tagged Caspian, geoeconomics, geopolitics, Kazakhstan, russia | Leave a Comment »
October 13, 2011
The Atlantic Council has today released a report titled “Georgia in the West: A Roadmap to Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic Future.” A summary at the linked page states:
The report makes recommendations for policymakers in Washington and key European capitals to strengthen Georgia’s ongoing integration into NATO and the European Union, by offering a clear vision and concrete intermediate benefits to reward Georgia’s progress. It offers recommendations for the Georgian government and all sectors of Georgian society to undertake important internal reforms that advance Georgian democracy and in turn secure Georgia’s place in the West. It also lays out strategies to counter Russia’s creeping annexation of the occupied territories and to solidify an international commitment to Georgia’s territorial integrity over the long-term.
Russia sees Georgia as firmly within its own sphere of influence, and any moves by the West to move into the Caucasus via Georgia is likely to antagonize them. However, two recommendations within this report are certain to draw quick responses from the Russians. First, the proposal to sell weapons to Georgia; second, the notion of deploying US troops there:
Bolster the US footprint in Georgia. Georgia’s security strategy is premised on deterrence. Any US presence in Georgia helps to augment that deterrence, and just as importantly, reinforces a psychological sense of security among the population. In the absence of formal security guarantees, the United States should augment a small military footprint associated with its: 1) program to train Georgian forces for coalition operations; 2) support to NATO’s Partnership for Peace Training Center; and 3) facilities and logistics to handle transit of forces and equipment from Afghanistan now and, in smaller numbers, in the future, and to serve as a logistics hub for access to Central Asia.
EGP is fully supportive of Atlanticism in general and certainly supports and encourages the expansion of the US geopolitical footprint in the Black Sea and Trans Caucasus regions in particular. However, this particular set of proposals seems prematurely aggressive. The Atlantic Alliance is spread thin militarily and its component nations are all in a financial bind – it is unlikely that they could effectively respond to a similarly aggressive Russian response to a move like this. Also, stripped of its boilerplate idealism about promoting democracy and extending Western institutions, there is next to no geostrategic rationale offered for the need to offer such a commitment to Georgia. Certainly, such a rationale exists – this blog is partially dedicated to that idea itself. But, the rationale needs to be debated openly and publicly, not hidden behind the old platitudes about democracy promotion. In the wake of the Iraq War, the public will not fall for that deception anymore. This report proposes that we plant a flag on the doorstep of Putin’s Russia and defend it with a US military commitment. The public needs to know the truth – that the region is a gateway to vast stores of fossil fuels and the domination of that region by a single nation or alliance opposed to our system and values would have devastating consequences. That is why we were in Iraq, that is why we are interested in Georgia and Azerbaijan. The world is going to see a global struggle for oil and gas over the next few decades, and the US and the West need to be positioned for that fight. Democracy promotion is a tool to leverage access to those positions, not the goal itself.
Posted in Atlanticism, Azerbaijan, Caspian Basin, Coalitioning, geopolitics, georgia, Grand Strategy, NATO, Russia, Transcaucasus | Tagged Atlanticism, coalitioning, georgia, NATO, russia, Transcaucasus | 2 Comments »
October 11, 2011
Once and future Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Hu Jintao begin high level meetings in Beijing today. While the two powers are nominal partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a loose alliance of Central Asian states, they often seem to be competitors more than partners. A massive deal that would make Russia the largest supplier of energy to China (and to entwine the two nations’ futures together) has been on the table for a decade but has yet to reach fruition. In the interim, both nations are scrambling for influence and access to (if not control over) the vast, untapped energy supplies of the various Central Asian states. Also, Putin’s vision of integrating the economies of the Central Asian states with that of Russia and other former Soviet states seems to indicate favoritism for Russia’s other Central Asian treaty group (the Collective Security Treaty Organization, CSTO) over the SCO.
While the US was heavily engaged in Central Asia, Russia and China had reason to seek common cause and balance that presence. This was problematic for the US and the West, as a Sino-Russian alliance has the potential to dominate all of Eurasia. As the American adventures in the region wind down, however, the need for those two nations to cooperate diminishes and their more natural competition rises to the surface. A century ago, geostrategists such as Halford Mackinder feared an alliance between Germany and Russia would create a mighty power that would dominate the world. The natural causes for enmity between the two nations ultimately prevented that union from occurring. Now, on the opposite side of the land mass, history may be repeating itself and preventing a similar – and similarly feared – union between Russia and China.
Posted in geopolitics, China, Russia, Central Asia, Coalitioning, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, CSTO, Eurasianism | Tagged russia, China, CSTO, coalitioning, Central Asia, SCO | 2 Comments »
October 6, 2011
“Five years ago the story was European companies establishing bases in China. Now the story is that China is strategically acquiring European companies – giving it ownership of vital infrastructure, access to cutting-edge technologies and allowing it to play some European countries off against others.”
François Godement and Jonas Parello-Plesner.
European strategists and policy makers are very concerned by the rapidly increasing Chinese economic influence on the continent. A recent analysis from the European Council on Foreign Relations highlighted those concerns:
(The) expansion of China’s presence in Europe comes just as the EU was beginning to develop a tougher, more coordinated strategy towards China. But the effects of the economic crisis are already undermining Europe’s embryonic unity and making it much harder to implement this new approach. In particular, if China becomes a major financial, investment and public provider for Europe, it will leave the Europeans little leverage to improve their own access to these very same sectors in China, which are mostly closed or controlled. In short, as Europeans compete with each other for Chinese business, they diminish their leverage and thus reduce their chances of collectively striking a better deal with China.
As the Eurozone crisis worsens, the opportunities for further Chinese inroads only increase.
Posted in China, Europe, geoeconomics, geopolitics | Tagged China, Europe, geoeconomics, geopolitics | Leave a Comment »
September 29, 2011
India’s state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Company (ONGC) announced yesterday that it has signed a deal with Vietnam to develop off shore sites in the South China Sea. The announcement was met with an immediate response from the Chinese Foreign Ministry:
As for oil and gas exploration activities, our consistent position is that we are opposed to any country engaged in oil and gas exploration and development activities in waters under China’s jurisdiction. We hope foreign countries do not get involved in the South China Sea dispute.
China makes vast claims to sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, based on what they term as “ancient” rights. As the map below demonstrates, the Chinese claims overlap those of every other nation bordering the oil-rich sea (Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia). Vietnam makes the next largest claim in the region, claiming an area extending out 200 miles from their coastline based on the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Seas.
This is not the first run-in between China and India over the South China Sea – last summer, a Chinese naval vessel confronted an Indian navy ship in Vietnamese waters, and just two weeks ago, China issued a formal warning to all nations that it considered the SCS its “indisputable” property. China also had brief naval run-ins with both Vietnam and Philippines this summer.
China also sees an American hand behind India’s push into the SCS. “As a South Asian country, India actively takes part in East Asian issues through the support of the US, which has been advocating for Asian countries to counter China. The US takes every opportunity to counter China, and its joint military maneuvers with Japan and other regional countries have been more frequent in recent years,” Chinese think-tanker Wu Xinbo told the Global Times.
Personally, I don’t believe the US is “pushing” India at all. India’s natural growth and needs – and wariness of China – provide all the necessary impetus. Although, as I have written before, the United States should seek to encourage and foster India’s growth as a world power, as we have much in common as the world’s two largest democracies and as flowers from the same tree of British liberal tradition. While it is in no one’s interest to see a war break out in the vital sea lanes of the SCS, and the US should thus seek to soothe both sides rather than inflame them, it is certainly in the long term interest of the US to ally with a growing Indian maritime presence.
Posted in geopolitics, China, oil, South China Sea, India, Grand Strategy | Tagged geopolitics, oil, China, India, South China Sea, naval power | Leave a Comment »
September 27, 2011
Rajeev Srinivasan presents in this article a very harsh and stinging analysis of the US adventure in Afghanistan from an Indian point of view. The author claims that the Pakistani intelligence service, ISI, has mastered “the fine art of running with the hares while hunting with the hounds” and has twisted the US to its own strategic goals (while bamboozling successive US administrations into paying for its own defeat). Srinivasan writes:
In effect, the only ones who have benefited from the collapse of American clout are the Arabs, the Pakistanis and the Chinese. The Arabs, especially the oil-exporting dictatorships (with the sole exception of Libya) have managed to maintain their status quo ante, and they have parlayed the billions from an oil-addicted world into radicalised millions everywhere through insistent propaganda.
The Pakistanis have achieved their coveted ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan which is, in effect, their colony. True, there has been some cost to them in civilian casualties and the Frankenstein monster of internal terrorism, but that is collateral damage the Army is willing to accept in the pursuit of their strategic goals.
The unkindest cut is perhaps that China has won against the Americans. Again. This is the third military conflict where China has had the better of the Americans. In Korea, they fought to a standstill. In Vietnam, a then-Chinese ally defeated the Americans. In Afghanistan, Chinese ally Pakistan is doing this. This must be China’s dream come true: they are beating the Americans militarily and economically.
Srinivasan, again, is writing from the Indian point of view and ponders the question of what India should do going forward. If I might interject my American point of view, I believe that India and the US have deeply shared interests not only in Central, South and Southwest Asia, but globally as well. I believe that India, because of its democratic heritage, relatively open society, and latent power (both hard and soft) is destined to succeed the US as global hegemon, if not at the end of the current cycle, then certainly by the end of this century when the sixth cycle closes. Just as the British handed off hegemony to the US during the last century, the United States should build deep ties with India, begin a strategy of “graceful decline,” and prepare to hand off global leadership to India. The US can play a supporting role to Indian hegemony not unlike the one that Great Britain played for the US. It is the current world system of open markets and democratic nations that best provides security and prosperity, and this is the best means of maintaining that system.
Posted in Afghanistan, geopolitics, Grand Strategy, India, Long Cycle Theory | Tagged Afghanistan, geopolitics, grand strategy, India, Long Cycle Theory | 2 Comments »
September 26, 2011
CNA’s China Studies division has issued a new report examining various aspects of China’s drive to build a more robust naval presence in the Western Pacific. From the abstract:
China is an emerging maritime actor with expanding interests in security at sea. As a consequence, the capabilities of Chinese maritime security forces are improving, missions for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) are expanding, new actors and bureaucratic interests are emerging, and some observers feel that China is now more willing to challenge the interests of others in the maritime domain. CNA has undertaken this study to provide strategic-level context in order to foster discussion and debate about China’s maritime rise and its implications.
The United States has not faced a near-peer competitor, neither globally nor in local strategic regions, since the fall of the Soviet Union (and, arguably, not since the defeat of Imperial Japan over six decades ago). The rise of China represents a new challenge for both nations – for China, the challenge of building and mastering a naval warfare presence; for the US, the challenge of competing in a vital strategic region without clear and unquestioned naval dominance. This includes the need for a geo-strategic pivot of the US order of battle in the Western Pacific region.
Posted in China, geopolitics, Grand Strategy, navy | Tagged China, geopolitics, naval power | 1 Comment »
September 22, 2011
For sixty years, US forces in the Western Pacific region have been centered on the NorthEast Asia and the threat of North Korea. The US military maintains a very large footprint in South Korea and Japan. However, with the rise of China and the growing concerns over Chinese expansionism among their neighbors in the South China Sea region, the US is facing a need to re-orient its forces southward over the next decade. Robert Haddick at the Council on Foreign Relations has a good introduction to the issues facing the US as it seeks to create a credible force without building permanent bases that would inflame the situation. It is a delicate situation, as any increased US involvement is met with stern Chinese warnings. The decision to upgrade Taiwan’s F-16 fleet (rather than selling them new planes, as they desired), was made to mollify the Chinese. Future relations with regional forces in Vietnam and the Philippines will be as delicate, if not more so.
Many defense analysts believe that China’s middle term goal is to project power out to, if not beyond, what the Chinese call “the second island chain) in the Pacific Ocean. Within that chain, China would be the dominant if not hegemonic power.
The Second Island Chain, it must be noted, includes the US territories of Guam and the Northern Marianas Islands. I believe the US should extend statehood to these territories (as a single combined unit) in order to make clear to both current and prospective allies (as well as the Chinese themselves) that the US is and will remain a permanent fixture in the Western Pacific.
Posted in China, geopolitics, Grand Strategy | 1 Comment »
September 14, 2011
James Rogers, Ph.D. candidate at Cambridge, presents a diagram of the strategic and security considerations that inform the developing pan-European grand strategic concept:
I would note two things. First, although Rogers has a sphere representing Atlanticism (the Atlantic Alliance in the lower right quadrant), he does not acknowledge the countervailing (if still nascent) force of Russian Eurasianism under Putin. Along those lines, to me, the obviously missing piece here is great power conflict. All possible peer or near-peer competitors with Europe are grouped as either Strategic Partners (BRIC) or true allies (US). Russia has already signaled a willingness to play upon Europe’s energy dependency (which Rogers does note in the upper left quadrant) and to use it’s “energy weapon;” while China is locking up exclusive energy rights across the globe. Energy is the lifeblood of both industry and modern agriculture, and the need to maintain access to it is more than a “post modern weakness,” it is a likely source of significant future conflict.
Posted in energy geopolitics, Eurasianism, Europe, geopolitics, Grand Strategy | Tagged energy geopolitics, Europe, geopolitics, grand strategy | Leave a Comment »
September 2, 2011
Yesterday, we wrote about Chinese and Russian advances in their ballistic missile defense systems. Today comes word that Turkey will host a NATO missile defense radar, ostensibly aimed at defending against potential attacks from Iran, but also capable of detecting launches from Russia. Turkey is a crucial nation to watch as the coalitioning phase of the current long cycle unwinds. Although the Turks have been long time allies of the United States and Western Europe through their NATO membership, they have also been flirting with Russia and China and continue to seek to make their own way.
UPDATE: Predictably, the Russians are complaining.
Posted in Coalitioning, geopolitics, missile defense, Turkey | Tagged coalitioning, geopolitics, missile defense, Turkey | 3 Comments »
September 1, 2011
China is developing both advanced technologies and asymmetric doctrines to challenge US dominance in the upper atmosphere and orbital geopolitical spheres. The Diplomat reports on recent Chinese advances in developing a ballistic missile defense shield, which was noted as a cause for attention in the recent US Department of Defense report on China. Russia is also building its own missile defense shield, and is offering it European nations as an alternative to a US system, while at the same time pressuring those nations to reject that system and even to ban US Navy ships that carry such systems from their waters.
Concurrent with the Pentagon China report, Taiwan also issued its own annual report on the capabilities of the Chinese military last month. Naval War College scholar and China expert Andrew Erickson has an early, rough translation of this report, and this section that he highlights is alarming:
Under the guidance to “balance nuclear and conventional,” the PLA has continued the development of independently targetable intercontinental range ballistic missiles, strengthened strategic nuclear intimidation, nuclear counter strike and conventional precision strike capabilities, and deployed anti-ship middle range ballistic missiles (DF-21D guided missile), which is a weapon developed to strike aircraft carriers; a small quantity of the missiles were produced and deployed in 2010, increasing the difficulty of military maneuvers in the region for the U.S. Army.
Erickson also has an important post on relative US and Chinese space power. While the US retains a very large lead in space based assets, China is both catching up rapidly and also developing relatively inexpensive asymmetric capabilities that can destroy or disrupt the very expensive US systems. Erickson is generally speaking essential reading on China (his site is permanently linked under the Foreign Policy and Strategy links section on the right side of this page), and this post in particular is informative. Go read the whole thing.
Posted in China, geopolitics, missile defense, Russia | Tagged China, geopolitics, missile defense, russia, space | 1 Comment »
August 31, 2011
Yoshihiko Noda was elected president of Japan’s ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), thus becoming the third DPJ leader to become Japan’s Prime Minister since taking power in 2009. While the DPJ came to power questioning the long time alliance with the United States and seeking to warm relations with China, both of those positions have subsequently softened and both previous DPJ PMs moved closer to the US. Read this excellent summary of recent Japanese politics and foreign policies from this month’s Foreign Affairs for background.
Noda seems to be the most pro-American of the three DPJ leaders. Although reconstruction from the Great Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami, as well as dealing with the crippled Fukushima reactors, will dominated Noda’s agenda, he will not be able to long escape attending to Japan’s role in the growing competition between China and Japan for Asia/Pacific hegemony. China is already beginning to apply pressure. As Elizabeth Economy at the Council on Foreign Relations’ Asia Unbound blog writes:
While Premier Wen Jiabao and the Chinese Foreign Ministry have offered up short congratulatory statements to the new prime minister, most Chinese commentary has ranged from bleak to belligerent. Chinese analysts point out that the prime minister has not renounced his comments to the effect that Class-A Japanese wartime leaders should no longer be considered criminals nor has he committed not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine. He also has made reference to China’s rising nationalism and naval activities as posing a risk to regional stability. To top it all off, the new prime minister has been a strong supporter of the U.S.-Japan defense alliance.
Economy also notes several “suggestions” that the Chinese have for Prime Minister Noda that read like a list of demands from a master to a vassal. Japan is an indispensible linchpin of the US alliance system. EGP hopes that the US offers Noda a genuine attitude of partnership to counterpoint China’s immediate attitude of high handedness.
Posted in China, Coalitioning, geopolitics, Japan | Tagged China, coalitioning, geopolitics, Japan | Leave a Comment »
